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Professors Brudney and Chirelstein urge a new approach to judi- 
cial supervision of mergers between parent and subsidiary corpora- 
tions. They argue that a fair merger requires that gains generated 
by the combination should be shared by the two corporations rather 
than wholly absorbed by either, and they posit a sharing formula to 
provide fair treatment to all parties to the merger. Rather than at- 
tempting to intuit or deduce the result of an arm's-length bargain 
that does not and cannot exist in the parent-subsidiary context, the 
authors emphasize the joint obligation of management to the public 
stockholders of both companies. The sharing formula for mergers 
may be used to determine the fairness of other decisions made by 
the parent during the period of affiliation. Finally, the authors sug- 
gest a somewhat different sharing formula for mergers which are the 
contemplated second step following an acquisition of control. 
W HAT legal standards should the courts apply in testing the 
"fairness" of a merger between a parent corporation and 
a subsidiary, where the parent owns a controlling interest in the 
subsidiary's stock and the remaining shares are held by public 
stockholders? This problem, which is one of long standing in 
the field of fiduciary obligation, has gained importance in recent 
years because of the increasing incidence of partial takeovers of 
public companies by other firms. Typically, the takeover process 
begins with a corporation's acquiring (by public tender offer, 
market purchases, private negotiation, or a combination of these) 
a controlling, but not a Ioo percent, stock interest in what is then 
the target company. In some instances partial ownership is 
merely a transitory step towards full ownership; acquisition of 
control is followed within a short time by merger of the new sub- 
sidiary into the acquiring company. In others, the status of 
parent and subsidiary is preserved for an extended period; the 
parent operates the subsidiary as such through a board of direc- 
tors composed of the parent's nominees, but ultimately elects to 
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merge the subsidiary into itself, thereby obtaining direct owner- 
ship of all of the subsidiary's assets. Under either circumstance, 
the public stockholders of the merging subsidiary receive stock or 
other securities of the parent, or cash, in exchange for their 
minority shares. 
The purchase price or exchange rate for the public stock- 
holders' interest is necessarily determined unilaterally by the 
parent's management, rather than through arm's-length bargain- 
ing. The parent's proposal of the merger is virtually, and perhaps 
actually, equivalent to its approval by the requisite statutory 
majority of the subsidiary. To be sure, unilateral decision is un- 
avoidable in this context and could not of itself constitute a viola- 
tion of fiduciary duty. But given the evident, and indeed quite 
natural, tendency of management to view its obligation to the 
parent and its stockholders as primary, and to regard the sub- 
sidiary's public stockholders as outsiders, the value placed on the 
subsidiary's assets will often be as low as reasonable pessimism 
will allow. 
For this reason, and because of the visible conflicts of interest 
they generate, mergers between parents and partly-owned sub- 
sidiaries are a favorite target for legal challenge by dissenters. 
It is generally agreed that the parent stands in a fiduciary relation- 
ship to the subsidiary's public stockholders, which creates a special 
obligation to deal fairly with them when acquiring their interest. 
Indeed, unilateral action by the parent - in setting the merger 
price and consenting to it on behalf of the subsidiary - poses the 
classic self-dealing problem which equity courts have traditionally 
resolved through the enforcement of fiduciary standards. How- 
ever, in the present context, those standards lack the clear con- 
tractual or statutory basis which they have, for example, in in- 
solvency reorganizations. Possibly for that reason, in determining 
whether the parent's treatment of the subsidiary's stockholders 
is truly fair, courts rarely have been able to extend fiduciary safe- 
guards beyond the point of simple fraud. 
Our overall goal in this Article is to consider what role a sub- 
stantive requirement of fairness ought to play in providing addi- 
tional protection to the public stockholders of a merging sub- 
sidiary. More particularly, our objectives are, first, to see whether 
fairness is a necessary or suitable element of merger regulation; 
and second, to consider what specific quantitative content such a 
fairness requirement might appropriately have. Although the two 
questions tend to run together somewhat, we deal with the first 
in Part I by examining and evaluating the other major protective 
devices provided by the corporate law - namely, ratification and 
appraisal rights. The second of our concerns is taken up in Part 
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II, in which we attempt to develop a sharing formula for mergers 
which occur after an extended period of affiliation between parent 
and subsidiary. Finally, in Part III we examine mergers which 
take place immediately, or shortly, after control of the subsidiary 
has been acquired by the parent -that is, prior to any sub- 
stantial intervening period of combined operations. 
By way of limitation, we emphasize that our aim is to explore 
investor protection schemes - that is, to examine and reformu- 
late certain aspects of the corporate law of merger - and not to 
decide whether corporate combinations are desirable from an 
antitrust standpoint or whether consumers and others are well 
served by the creation of ever larger financial aggregates. Fur- 
ther, we cover only one important feature of merger regulation 
many others are left untouched or mentioned only in passing. 
Finally, our interest is solely in publicly-held corporations - that 
is, in companies whose shares are owned by an appreciable num- 
ber of investors not actively involved in management - and only 
in mergers between parents and subsidiaries. 
I. RATIFICATION AND APPRAISAL 
The traditional legal safeguards against the exploitation of 
public stockholders by management or by a controlling group in 
mergers have been stockholder approval and the statutory apprai- 
sal right. Whether or not the combination of "voice" and "exit" 
was institutionalized in deference to a perceived need for protec- 
tion of the public stockholders against the insiders,' those two 
procedures are the principal modes provided by statute for stock- 
holder self-defense. In our view, neither is sufficient. 
A. Ratification 
The inadequacy of stockholder approval as a protective pro- 
cedure has been discussed elsewhere at length.2 Whatever its 
value as a protective device in a merger between unrelated enter- 
It has been suggested that the role given to stockholders originated in an 
effort to mask, rather than to check, the power of management to effect mergers, 
and in any event serves the former function. See Manning, The Shareholder's 
Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 228-29 (I962). 
But see Flarsheim v. Twenty Five Thirty Two Broadway Corp., 432 S.W.2d 245, 252 
(Mo. I968); Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in 
Modern Corporate Decision Making, 57 CALIF. L. REV. I, 76-79 (I969); Levy, 
Rights of Dissenting Stockholders to Appraisal and Payment, I5 CORNELL L.Q. 420, 
421 (1930). 
2 See, e.g., SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, AC- 
TIVITIES, PERSONNEL, AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COM- 
MITTEES pt. VII, at 555-56 (I940) [hereinafter cited as SEC PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE 
STUDY]; Eisenberg, supra note i; Manning, supra note I, at 226-27. 
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prises, it affords no protection when a parent combines with a 
subsidiary and the parent owns the amount of the subsidiary's 
stock required to approve the transaction. Where the parent owns 
less than the statutory requirement, there is at least a technical 
possibility that the public stockholders might reject the merger 
plan; but the ability of the stockholders to exercise their voting 
rights with real effect even in that situation is slight.3 Indeed, 
even if the merger plan were made effective only when approved 
by a majority of the public stockholders, as if the latter were a 
separate class, the barriers to concerted stockholder action in the 
context of management's exclusive control of the proxy machinery 
would almost always assure a favorable vote. The atomized 
nature of the company's stockholdings, together with the easy 
salability of shares, means that stockholders cannot rely on group 
action to reject what they see as a mistaken decision to merge, 
particularly when the decision was made by a parent holding a 
large block of stock. Moreover, ratification gives dissatisfied 
stockholders only the limited option of rejecting the merger; they 
do not generally either initiate the merger discussion or partic- 
ipate in formulating its terms. They are confined to approving 
or disapproving a transaction, the terms of which are defined by 
management and can rarely be modified by stockholders during, 
or after, the bargaining process.4 Finally, since the timing and 
context for seeking approval of the merger are also dictated by 
management 5 which controls, and has unlimited access to, the 
proxy apparatus, the process of seeking stockholder approval is 
skewed in favor of a vote for approval. 
Voting rights do serve, however, as a conceptual premise on 
which to build a requirement of disclosure. Thus, notwithstand- 
ing the inadequate protection which the suffrage affords public 
stockholders in mergers involving combinations of parents and 
subsidiaries, recent cases suggest that, even when the parent owns 
two-thirds or more of the subsidiary's stock, the existence of the 
right to vote imports an obligation on the part of the subsidiary 
corporation and those who control it to make adequate disclosure 
to stockholders of the terms and consequences of the merger.6 
3 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note I, at 23-43; Manning, supra note I, at 229. 
4 While a kind of stockholder participation occurs when management consults 
with the holders of large blocks of stock, such participation is apt at best to set 
limits on management's initiative, but is not likely to impel management to initiate 
transactions. 
5 Cf. American Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 37 Del. Ch. 59, 136 A. 
2d 690 (Sup. Ct. 1957). 
6 See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. 
REP. f 94,853 (2d Cir., Oct. 31, 1974); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 
Inc., 4I5 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. I973); Voege v. Ackerman, 364 F. Supp. 72 
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That obligation, embodied primarily in federal law,7 may offer two 
kinds of protection to public stockholders against an overreaching 
parent. First, disclosure of the terms and consequences of the 
merger exposes insiders to the glare of publicity. The knowledge 
that any disadvantageous or unequal treatment which they impose 
on public stockholders will be exposed to the full view of investors 
may impel the insiders to treat the public stockholders more 
generously than otherwise. Second, even when the voting power 
of public shareholders is arithmetically useless, a detailed under- 
standing of the terms and import of the merger may incline a 
greater number of them to seek appraisal, or even, on grounds of 
unfairness, to attempt to enjoin the merger or obtain a larger 
share of its proceeds.8 
Of course, the protection afforded by disclosure depends in 
considerable measure on what management is required to reveal. 
Recent judicial interpretation of disclosure requirements in merg- 
ers, particularly in parent-subsidiary mergers, has expanded the 
categories of disclosable information substantially.9 But while 
the broadening base for liability of directors and officers will un- 
doubtedly impel more significant disclosure of conflicting in- 
terests,l1 the central problems of valuation are not likely to be 
solved by disclosure requirements. Longstanding prohibitions on 
disclosures of future earnings estimates are only now beginning 
to be relaxed,1l but neither the case law nor the SEC rules re- 
(S.D.N.Y. I973); Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), 
aff'd, 448 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1971). Compare Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d 
Cir. I972) (complaint under rule Iob-5 did not make out cause of action if no 
allegation of misrepresentation as to merger), with Popkin v. Wheelabrator-Frye, 
Inc., [I973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ?1 94,09I (S.D.N.Y. 1973) 
(even when parent controls subsidiary, failure to disclose leads to liability under 
proxy rules). 
7 See, e.g., Securities Act of I933, 15 U.S.C. ?? 77a-77aa (1970) (registration 
of securities offerings); Securities and Exchange Act of I934 ?? I3(d), I4(d), 15 
U.S.C. ?? 78m(d), 78n(d) (1970) (filing requirements); 17 C.F.R. ? 240.Iob(5) 
(I973), implementing Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ? iob, I5 U.S.C. ? 
78j(b) (1970) (antifraud provision); 17 C.F.R. ?? 24o.I4a-I to I4a-io (I973), 
implementing Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ? I4, 15 U.S.C. ? 78n(a) (1970) 
(proxy rules). 
8 See cases cited note 6 supra. 
9 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970); Kohn v. American 
Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 262-66, 269 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
874 (I972); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th 
Cir. 1969); Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Iowa 1970); Colonial Realty 
Co. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Pa. I970). 
10 See, e.g., Metz, An Unusual 'Go-Private' Plan, N.Y. Times, Oct. i8, 1974, at 
58, cols. 3-4. 
1 Although the Securities and Exchange Commission has indicated that it 
proposes to permit, if not to require, forecasts of earnings, see SEC Securities Act 
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quire an adequate presentation of alternatives to the proposed 
merger,l2 although such information is crucial for stockholders to 
evaluate the merits of the proposed merger and to determine the 
advisability of exercising appraisal or other legal rights. More- 
over, even if disclosure were adequate in terms of categories 
covered, a well-informed electorate is insufficiently protected 
Release No. 5362 (Feb. 2, I973), judicial imposition of liability for misleading 
prediction may deter management from taking advantage of the opportunity to 
make such forceasts even when so inclined. See Beecher v. Able, [Current] 
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 94,450 (S.DN.Y., Mar. 4, I974). But see Dolgow 
v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 686-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d 
Cir. 1972). See also Skovsen, Sharp, & Toulman, Corporate Disclosure of Bud- 
getary Data, 133 J. ACCOUNTANCY 50 (I972). Possibly Rule I45, 17 C.F.R. ? 
230.145 (1973), will be interpreted to require statements of the earnings projec- 
tions of both parties to the merger, on both a premerger and a postmerger basis, 
cf. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 
254, 261 n.20 (I972), but the case law is far from clear on the question of com- 
municating earnings projections or current values of fixed assets, see Sunray DX 
Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447 (Ioth Cir. I968); Mader v. 
Armel, [I97o-I97I Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 93,027, at 90,796 
(S.D. Ohio I97I), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 
(I973); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip., 332 F. Supp. 544, 549-75 (E.D.N.Y. 
I97I); SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd in 
relevant part sub nom. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 
(2d Cir. I973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (I974); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, 
Inc., 322 F. Supp. I33I (E.D. Pa. 1970), modified, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 
(E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in relevant part, 478 F.2d 128I (2d Cir. I973). See also 
Note, Disclosing Current Values of Fixed Assets in Corporate Reorganizations, 55 
CORNELL . REV. 285 (1970); Comment, The Use of Appraisals in SEC Docu- 
ments, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 138 (I973). 
12 The cases increasingly suggest that not merely firm offers but other pos- 
sibilities which have some minimum probability of realization must be disclosed 
and explained in the material which solicits mergers or recapitalizations. See, e.g., 
Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1969); Levin 
v. Marder, 343 F. Supp. 1050, 1057-58 (W.D. Pa. 1972); United States Smelting 
Refining & Mining Co. v. Clevite Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. 
SEC. L. REP. ff 92,691, at 99,051-54 (N.D. Ohio I968); cf. Moses v. Burgin, 445 
F.2d 369, 376 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 944 (I97I); Robinson v. Penn 
Central Co., 336 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. I97I); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing 
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. I97I); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, 
Inc., 322 F. Supp. I33I (E.D. Pa. 1970), modified, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972). These suggestions, however, are vague and their 
implementation is difficult, in view of the uncertainty of the terms of the alter- 
native possibilities and the even larger uncertainty of their realization. See, e.g., 
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974); Nanfito v. 
Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th 
Cir. 1973); Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 337 F. Supp. I94 (D. 
Colo. I972); cf. Prettner v. Aston, 339 F. Supp. 273 (D. Del. 1972); McConnell 
v. Lucht, 320 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See generally Goolrick, Some Dis- 
closure Problems In Acquisition Proxy Statements and Prospectuses, 28 Bus. LAW. 
III, II9-I2I (I972). See also cases cited note 84 infra. 
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against illegal diversion unless it is further armed with a stand- 
ard of fair conduct which is enforceable by the courts.l3 Indeed, 
the end result which disclosure is said by the courts to serve in 
parent-subsidiary mergers - to trigger the exercise of appraisal 
rights or challenges for unfairness - may require judicial inter- 
vention to provide some norm of fairness for protection of the 
public stockholders. And it is not merely when disclosure require- 
ments are complied with that a fairness standard ultimately must 
be invoked in order to offer adequate protection to public stock- 
holders. As recent cases have made clear,14 failure to comply with 
disclosure requirements also implicates the fairness question. If, 
as frequently happens, the merger has been consummated by the 
time the inadequacy of disclosure is adjudicated, the only relief 
available turns on some measure of the adequacy of the price - 
which poses the fairness question in another format.'5 The remedy 
13 If, as has been suggested, rule Iob-5 requires full disclosure, but will not 
support a challenge for unfairness when such disclosure has been made, see Popkin 
v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. I972); Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331, 337-38 
(S.D.N.Y. I972). But cf. Knauf v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 277 F. Supp. 564, 
570, 577, 579 (D. Wyo. I967), aff'd in relevant part, 408 F.2d 958, 964 (Ioth Cir.), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 831 (I969), the disclosure requirements remain an incom- 
plete remedy for alleged unfairness. See generally Jacobs, The Role of Securities 
Exchange Act Rule Iob-5 in The Regulation of Corporate Mismanagement, 59 
CORNELL L. REV. 27, 89-91 (I973). Notwithstanding the Second Circuit's retreat 
in Popkin v. Bishop, supra, from its language in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (I969), such chal- 
lenges under rule iob-5 are not yet precluded. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 
[Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ?1 94,853 (2d Cir., Oct. 31, 1974); Dasho v. 
Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d II, 26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (I972); 
Levine v. Biddle Sawyer Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ? 94,816 
(S.D.N.Y., Oct. 7, I974); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. Io62, Io70 
(N.D. Ga. I972), aff'd on other grounds, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. I974). 
14 See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (I970) (fairness not a de- 
fense to nondisclosure liability); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d II (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972) (fairness as a means of measuring dam- 
ages); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 
1969); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 873 (D. Del. 1973); 
Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. I972); Grestle v. Gamble-Skogmo, 
Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. I969), aff'd in relevant part, 478 F.2d 1281 
(2d Cir. 1973). 
15 Even a timely and successful challenge to a merger based solely upon the 
inadequacy of the disclosure of its terms and import may indirectly implicate the 
fairness question. While a successful challenge may only delay the merger until 
adequate disclosure is made, it is also possible that a requirement of full disclosure 
will induce a modification of the transaction which eliminates all reasonable 
grounds for challenging fairness or will result in a settlement at a somewhat better 
price for stockholders than was originally proposed in the merger. Cf. In re Brown 
Co. Securities Litigation, [1972-I973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. l 
93,751 (S.D.N.Y. I973). 
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for failure to disclose thus becomes revision of the transaction by 
application of a fairness standard.16 
B. Appraisal Rights 
The statutory right of appraisal provides shareholders dis- 
senting from a decision to merge with the option of receiving a 
cash payment from the merged company equal to the "value" of 
their shares. Appraisal has been called "a remedy of desperation," 
"technical . . . expensive ... .uncertain . . . and, in the case 
of a publicly held corporation, . . . unlikely to produce a better 
result than could have been obtained on the market." 17 But even 
with these deficiencies in view, many writers have supported the 
continued availability of the appraisal right as a last-ditch check 
on management improvidence or as a countervailing force against 
abuse of discretion by insiders.l1 Whether appraisal otherwise 
should be continued or eliminated, the question of interest in our 
inquiry is what specific relationship the right of appraisal bears 
to the conflict-of-interest problems afflicting parent-subsidiary 
mergers. If the law affords appraisal rights, should it also provide 
a fairness test, or does appraisal render fairness superfluous as a 
device for protecting the subsidiary's public stockholders' in- 
terests? 
In answering that question, it is important to remember that 
the object of appraisal is to give dissident stockholders an oppor- 
tunity to avoid the consequences of merger, not to undo the 
merger or to press directly for better terms. Appraisal statutes 
generally make explicit that the claim for which the dissenter is 
to be compensated in cash is the value of his shares "exclusive of 
any element of value arising from the expectation or accomplish- 
ment of the merger or consolidation." 19 Drawing generally on the 
16 But compare the notion articulated by the Supreme Court in Mills v. 
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (I970), that a showing of fairness will not 
save an inadequate disclosure from the necessity for corrective action. See also 
Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 270 (3d Cir. 1972); Popkin 
v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., [I973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 
94,09I, at 94,371 (S.D.N.Y. I973); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose 
Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (E.D. Pa. I970). 
17 See Eisenberg, supra note i, at 85. 
18 See id. at 8I, 86; Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Ap- 
praisal Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REV. 233 (I93I); Note, Valuation of Dissenters Stock 
Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REV. I453, I455-56 (1966); Note, Corpora- 
tion Law-Dissenting Stockholder's Right of Appraisal - Determination of Value, 
28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 102I (1953); Comment, Valuation Problems Created by the 
Dissenting Stockholder, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 295 (I958). 
19DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ? 262(b) (1953); see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW ? 
623(n)(4) (McKinney I963); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ? 8I (1969). See 
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premerger market price of the acquired company's stock, but in 
many jurisdictions also looking to such factors as previous years' 
earnings, dividends, and asset values,20 the appraisal process 
is thus designed to generate a claim on behalf of dissenting stock- 
holders equal to the value of their shares in the old firm, just as 
if it had continued on its customary course without the interven- 
tion of a merger bid. Hence, where the merger is perceived as 
producing gains for the combined enterprise,21 the appraisal price 
by itself is inadequate to permit the subsidiary's stockholders to 
receive any part of those gains. By the same token, it is not the 
object of the appraisal proceeding to require an overreaching 
parent to redistribute any portion of the merger gains among the 
subsidiary's public stockholders.22 Moreover, even if premerger 
share value is accepted as the proper measure of minority rights, 
in practice appraisal often seems inadequate as a valuation proc- 
ess. The valuation reached in an appraisal proceeding is usually 
based on existing data, that is, on whatever information has been 
made public about the corporation at the merger date. But the 
also Beechwood Sec. Corp. v. Associated Oil Co., 104 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. I939); 
Jeffrey v. American Screw Co., 98 R.I. 286, 201 A.2d I46 (I964). 
20The manner in which the value of the old stock is determined and par- 
ticularly the weight given to market value varies among jurisdictions. See, e.g., 
authorities cited note i8 supra; Comment, Valuation of Dissenting Minorities' 
Shares Under Section 21 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, 17 FORD. L. 
REV. 259 (I948). Some legislatures have effectively made market price the con- 
clusive test of value by permitting elimination of appraisal where the stock has 
a public market. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ? 262(k) (Supp. I970); ABA- 
ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ? 80 (I969); N.J. REV. STAT. ? I4A:II-I (Supp. 
I968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, ? I5I5L (Supp. I974). 
21 See note 33 infra. 
22 The appraisal remedy might prevent overreaching of the public stockholders 
if the price offered in the merger were actually less than the premerger market price 
of the target company's shares, or if the dissenters could demonstrate that pre- 
merger market price did not accurately reflect the "intrinsic" value of the firm. 
Generally, however, the merger arrangements, at least between previously unrelated 
enterprises, will award the stockholders some premium over market - though pre- 
sumably no more than necessary to attract approval from a statutory majority. 
See, e.g., L. DELLENBARGER, COMMON STOCK VALUATION IN INDUSTRIAL MERGERS 
76-78 (I966); G. MCCARTHY, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS 96-102 (1963); Halpern, 
Empirical Estimates of the Amount and Distribution of Gains to Companies in 
Mergers, 46 J. Bus. 554, 555-57 (1963). Similar premiums, although possibly 
smaller in amount, see L. DELLENBARGER, supra, at 141; Piper & Weiss, The Profit- 
ability of Multi-Bank Holding Company Acquisitions, 29 J. FIN. 163, 173 (I974), 
may also be payable in parent-subsidiary mergers where public stockholder ap- 
proval is necessary for the merger. Thus, a comparison of the offering price with 
the premerger market price will generally be pointless. And while a demonstration 
might conceivably be made that "intrinsic" worth exceeds market price at the 
merger date, nothing in the decided cases suggests that the fair value sought or 
awarded in appraisal proceedings purports to include amounts attributable to 
fiduciary violations in the merger process. 
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timing of the decision to merge may be based on the parent's 
anticipation of a substantial increase in the subsidiary's earnings. 
That anticipation may result from data known only to manage- 
ment which is not ripe for disclosure and which in many in- 
stances, therefore, will not have been reflected in the market price 
of the subsidiary's stock. Hence, judicial emphasis on the market 
price23 or on past earnings as the basis for projecting future earn- 
ings,24 is likely to result in underestimating the future earnings 
properly attributable to the old enterprise. Thus, the parent is in 
a position to induce appraisal at a time when the outsiders seeking 
the appraisal have little or no capacity to ascertain, let alone to 
demonstrate, the likelihood that the enterprise is currently worth 
more than its past record suggests. 
To this limitation -which we concede is not unique to ap- 
praisal valuation - can be added the shadow cast by the over- 
hang of the parent's control on the current market value of the 
subsidiary's shares.25 The resultant depressed price may be a 
function merely of the inability of new groups to acquire control 
on the market, but it may also be a function of the likelihood of 
exploitation such as an unfair merger, which would be too costly 
for disarrayed minority stockholders to challenge. In any event, 
any reliance upon market price to measure appraisal value visits 
upon the subsidiary's public stockholder the cost of the parent's 
control in determining appropriate compensation. 
In summary, our view is that the individual right of appraisal 
is not directly responsive to the problem of fiduciary abuse in 
mergers between parents and subsidiaries. Appraisal is predicated 
more on the conception of managerial incompetence in valuing 
the old enterprise and negotiating a price for it than on the notion 
of a conflict of interest which results in a diversion of a portion of 
the merger proceeds to a controlling parent.26 Moreover, it neither 
imposes its cost solely on the stockholders of the acquiring com- 
pany nor seeks to reimburse all the victims of the inadequate 
merger price, that is, all the public stockholders of the acquired 
23See, e.g., Gallois v. West End Chem. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 765, 774, 8 Cal. 
Rptr. 596, 6oo-oi (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Prall v. United States Leather Co., 6 N.J. 
Misc. 967, 143 A. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd per curiam, 105 N.J.L. 646, 146 A. 916 
(Ct. Err. & App. 1929); Jones v. Healy, 184 Misc. 923, 936, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349, 
359-60 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd mem., 270 App. Div. 895, 62 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1946). 
24 See, e.g., Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 
344, 348 (Del. Ch. 1973); Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 
413-I5, 2I3 A.2d 203, 211-12 (Sup. Ct. I965). 
25 Cf. Talley Indus., Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5953, 
[I969-I970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ? 77,774, at 83,792 (Jan. 9, 
1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971). 
26 Cf. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, ii6-i8, 460 P.2d 464, 477- 
78, 8i Cal. Rptr. 592, 605-o6 (1969). 
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company.27 Finally, appraisal is merely an option-out alternative, 
and as such it focuses on the premerger value of the acquired 
company's shares. In short, it neither serves nor is designed to 
serve as a remedy for the fiduciary misbehavior at which the fair- 
ness challenge is directed.28 
II. STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS IN PARENT-SUBSIDIARY MERGERS 
As we have noted, the occasion for judicial imposition of fair- 
ness constraints upon the terms of parent-subsidiary mergers 
arises because the terms are unilaterally imposed by the parent, 
rather than freely bargained at arm's length. Given the reason for 
judicial intrusion, the standard of fairness which the courts impose 
might most appropriately be a proxy for the bargain which the 
parent's power made impossible - the price at which the merger 
would have been arranged in a hypothetical free market by parties 
bargaining at arm's length.29 It might also be argued - as we 
shall do in section B of this Part- that the requisite standard 
of fairness should be derived from analogy to a fiduciary (such 
as an investment adviser with multiple accounts) allocating in- 
vestment opportunities among beneficiaries; the parent's manage- 
ment would be the fiduciary and the parent's stockholders and 
subsidiary's public stockholders would be the respective sets of 
beneficiaries. In either case, however, the standard of fairness 
27 Cf. Raynor v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 317 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. I974). 
28The usefulness of the appraisal remedy is as limited when it is invoked in 
ordinary arm's-length mergers between unrelated enterprises as when invoked in 
parent-subsidiary mergers. In the former type of merger, the fiduciary violation 
generally imputed to management is that some portion of the purchase price which 
the acquiring company was presumably willing to pay has been withheld from the 
acquired company's stockholders and either absorbed by management itself or else 
divided between it and the acquiring firm--with the result that the acquired 
company's stockholders receive less, in some unidentified amount, than they would 
have received had their management been devoted solely to their interests. If ap- 
praisal rights are to serve as an appropriate corrective, the valuation reached in an 
appraisal proceeding would have to be one which somehow restored that amount 
by hypothesizing a negotiated bargain or a competitive auction for control of the 
acquired company's shares. In any such competition or bargain, the management 
of the selling corporation, assuming it were uncorrupted, would hold out for and 
would receive, either from the other bargaining party or from the competitive 
bidders, some part of the selling corporation's contribution to the gains which are 
anticipated from the combined operation, and those gains would be apportioned 
ratably among the seller's stockholders. But such an element has never been in- 
cluded in valuation in appraisal proceedings, and indeed would be altogether con- 
trary to their purpose. 
29 See International Radio Tel. Co. v. Atlantic Communication Co., 290 F. 698, 
702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 705 (I923); Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry., 78 
F. Supp. 312, 317 (S.D.N.Y. I948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 919 (I949). 
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would differ significantly from that which now generally prevails 
when courts are called upon to assess the fairness of mergers. 
To put the matter in context, suppose that the merger of a 
parent and subsidiary is expected to generate an increment in 
the combined value of the two companies. In effect, the value of 
the merged entity is seen to exceed the sum of the premerger 
values of parent (P) and subsidiary (S) taken separately. We 
do not assert that this is always or even necessarily often true, 
but we think that it is likely to occur in more than a trivial 
number of cases for at least three reasons. First, there may be 
operating economies to be achieved through the elimination of 
duplicated functions or the like. Those opportunities for cost- 
saving may have existed but not been perceived by P before con- 
trol was acquired, or they may have arisen subsequently. Al- 
though most economies can be largely realized merely through the 
parent-subsidiary affiliation, some may not be fully realizable 
short of complete ownership.30 Second, merger may generate tax 
savings. Third, there may be stock market or financial benefits 
of a sort which became familiar to investors during the merger 
wave of the I960's. Recent experience supports the expectation 
that merger may sometimes lead to a higher market multiplier 
for the portion of the subsidiary's income stream not owned 
by the parent. If the subsidiary's earnings are discounted more 
heavily than the parent's, a mere shift in ownership may change 
the rate at which those earnings are capitalized by investors. 
Even when combined total earnings are unchanged, there is, as 
Lintner has noted, "an automatic increase in the earnings per 
share of the acquiring company whenever its price-earnings ratio 
is higher than that of the acquired firm." 31 Whether wisely or 
not, "many investors judge growth and growth prospects in terms 
of earnings per share," so that the merger may actually result 
in a higher aggregate value for the merging companies.32 
Whatever the reason for the increase in value when parent 
and subsidiary are merged,33 the question that arises from the 
30See Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. [Current] CCH FED. 
SEC. L. REP. ff 94,722 (N.D. Fla., July 15, I974) (absorbtion of subsidiary to 
avoid expenses of recordkeeping and inhibition against self-dealing and to eliminate 
duplication). 
31 See Lintner, Expectations, Mergers and Equilibrium in Purely Competitive 
Securities Markets, 6i AM. ECON. REV. IOI, IIO (I97I). 
32 Id. 
33 Mergers between previously unrelated enterprises occur, presumably, because 
at least the acquiring party, and generally both parties, believe that gains will 
result. See, e.g., W. ALBERTS & J. SEGALL, THE CORPORATE MERGER (I966); FTC, 
ECONOMIC REPORT ON 'CORPORATE MERGERS (I969), G. MCCARTHY, ACQUISITIONS 
AND MERGERS (1963). The hope of capturing the difference between the amount 
the acquiring party is willing to pay and some larger amount which it assigns to 
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standpoint of corporate law is whether the resulting increment 
must be divided among all the participants. Put otherwise, the 
issue is whether the parent as fiduciary should be compelled to 
share the increased value with the public stockholders of the 
subsidiary on some basis, or may instead appropriate that in- 
crease entirely to itself. 
A. The Present Law 
It is commonly said by courts and commentators that the 
fiduciary norm in this situation is one of arm's-length dealing; a 
fair price for the minority stock is that which an arm's-length 
bargain in a free market would have produced. In attempting to 
determine the fair arm's-length price, however, judicial opinions 
have concentrated on procedural matters34 and have left the 
the acquired enterprise or to gains from the combination of the two enterprises is 
presumably one stimulus to the merger. That difference may be the result of the 
stock market's misperception of the value of the acquired company, the possi- 
bilities of increased efficiency or product market dominance resulting from the 
merger, changes in financial structure, or stock market synergy or the like. See, 
e.g., Gort, An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers, 83 Q.J. ECON. 624 (I969); 
Halpern, Empirical Estimates of the Amount and Distribution of Gains to Com- 
panies in Mergers, 46 J. Bus. 554 (I973); Lewellen, A Pure Financial Rationale 
for the Conglomerate Merger, 26 J. FIN. 521 (I97I); Lintner, Expectations, 
Mergers and Equilibrium in Purely Competitive Securities Markets, 61 AM. ECON. 
REV. IOI (1971); Mueller, A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers, 83 Q.J. ECON. 643 
(1969). There is a considerable body of literature which questions whether merg- 
ers produce greater efficiency or profits over the long run. See, e.g., FTC, ECO- 
NOMIC REPORT ON CONGLOMERATE M RGER PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
OF NINE CORPORATIONS (1972); E. KELLY, PROFITABILITY OF GROWTH THROUGH 
MERGERS (1967); S. REID, MERGERS, MANAGERS AND THE ECONOMY (I968); A. 
SINGH, TAKEOVERS: THEIR RELEVANCE TO THE STOCK MARKET AND THE THEORY OF 
THE FIRM (1971); Austin & Fishman, The Tender Takeover, 4 MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 4 (1969); Hogarty, Profits from Mergers: The Evidence of Fifty 
Years, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 378 (spec. ed. 1970); Piper & Weiss, supra note 
22. See also, Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust 
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 9Ist Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 
8A, at 69-95 (I969). While the gains expected from mergers between previously 
unrelated enterprises may be based upon more varied expectations, parent-sub- 
sidiary mergers are not exercises in altruism. Whatever the cause, we may assume 
that the parent will rarely acquire the subsidiary's assets unless it perceives-and 
reasonably expects-a gain from the transaction. 
34 Thus, the location of the burden of proof (which appears to mean the burden 
of justifying the fairness of the merger) is said to be on the defenders of the merg- 
er in parent-subsidiary mergers, rather than on the challengers as in arm's-length 
mergers. Compare David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 432 
(Del. Ch. I968), and Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 
93 A.2d IO7, IIo (Sup. Ct. 1952), with Gomberg v. Midvale Co., I57 F. Supp. 
132, 137 (E.D. Pa. 1955), Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904 (Del. 
Ch. 1973), and Baron v. Pressed Metals of America, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 325, 332, 
117 A.2d 357, 361 (Ch. I955). But the impact of ratification by a majority of the 
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substantive formula ambiguous. Such formulas as the opinions 
disclose appear generally to focus on whether the value of what 
is surrendered by the public stockholders of the subsidiary is 
equivalent to the value of what they receive in exchange.35 While 
occasionally the cases suggest that fairness requires a sharing of 
the gains resulting from the merger,36 the test that is most often 
disinterested minority stockholders upon the courts' assessment of fairness is not 
entirely clear. Compare Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. I969), 
aff'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Sup. Ct. 1970), with David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, 
Inc., supra. See also Alcott v. Hyman, 40 Del. Ch. 449, i84 A.2d go (Ch. I962), 
aff'd, 42 Del. Ch. 233, 240, 208 A.2d 50I, 505 (Sup. Ct. I965); Brundage v. New 
Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 226 A.2d 585 (I967). 
35 The standard of equivalence between the "get" and the "give" as the test of 
fairness was adopted in early cases involving sales of assets for cash in trans- 
actions between unrelated enterprises, which were challenged by alleging that side 
benefits awarded to those in control affected their judgment. See, e.g., Allied 
Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., I4 Del. Ch. i, i8-20, I20 A. 486, 494-95, 
preliminary injunction dissolved after trial, 14 Del. Ch. 64, 122 A. 142 (Ch. 1923); 
cf. Marks v. Wolfson, 4I Del. Ch. II5, I88 A.2d 680 (Ch. 1963); Alcott v. Hyman, 
40 Del. Ch. 449, I84 A.2d go (Ch. I962), aff'd, 42 Del. Ch. 233, 208 A.2d 50o (Sup. 
Ct. I965); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 14 Del. Ch. 193, I26 A. 46 (Ch. 
1924). When the transaction was accomplished by merger, the courts continued 
to apply an equivalance test on the analogy to cash sales. No distinction appears 
to have been made between mergers of unrelated enterprises, see, e.g., Jackson Co. 
v. Gardiner Inv. Co., 200 F. II3 (ist Cir. 1912) (preliminary injunction), on appeal 
after decision on the merits, 2I7 F. 350 (ist Cir. I9I4), appeal dismissed, 239 U.S. 
628 (I9I5); Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, i8 Del. Ch. 47, 56, I56 A. i83, 
187 (Ch. I931), and mergers between parent and subsidiary, see, e.g., Sterling v. 
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d Io7 (Sup. Ct. I952); David J. 
Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); Bastian v. Bourns 
Inc., 256 A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. i969), aff'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Sup. Ct. I970); David J. 
Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. I968); Stryker & 
Brown v. Bon Ami, Civil No. I945 (Del. Ch., Mar. i6, I964), reprinted in PLI 
THIRD ANNUAL INST. ON SEC. REG. 573 (I972). See also Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, 
Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, Io4-05 (E.D.N.Y. I969), damages determined, 332 F. Supp. 
644 (E.D.N.Y. I97I), aff'd, 478 F.2d I28i (2d Cir., I973); Hill v. St. Louis Coke & 
Iron Corp., 9 F. Supp. 69, 74 (D. Del. I934) (sale for cash), aff'd sub nom. Anderson 
v. St. Louis Coke & Iron Corp., 79 F.2d 336 (3d Cir. I935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 
656 (I936); Abelow v. Symonds, 40 Del. Ch. 462, I84 A.2d I73 (Ch. 1962) (sale 
for cash), aff'd sub nom. Abelow v. Midstates Oil Corp., 4I Del. Ch. 445, I89 
A.2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Homer v. Crown 'Cork & Seal Co., I55 Md. 66, I4I 
A. 425 (1928) (sale for cash); Willcox v. Stern, i8 N.Y.2d I95, 219 N.E.2d 401, 
273 N.Y.S.2d 76 (I966). The complaint by dissenters that they have received 
less than equivalent value, rather than any claim that equivalence was an inade- 
quate test, has tended to define the issue for the courts on the question of fairness. 
36 Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., I99 F. 64 (8th Cir. I912), cert. denied, 
229 U.S. 615 (I9I3); Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Navig. Co., 27 F. 625 (C.C.D.N.Y. 
i886), appeal dismissed, I36 U.S. 645 (I890). The sharing requirement is some- 
times found in opinions of the Securities and Exchange Commission dealing with 
the fairness of mergers under the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. ? 8oa (I970). 
LaSalle St. Capital Corp., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6693 (Aug. 
23, I97I); Talley Indus. Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5953, 
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decipherable 37 is one which merely echoes the appraisal standard 
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ? 77,774 (Jan. 9, 1970); 
Townsend Corp. of America, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4045, at 
35-39 (Sept. 2, 1964); Atlas Corp., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2920 
(Oct. 19, 1959). Compare Burco Inc., 15 S.E.C. 828, 832-33 (1944), with Iowa 
Interests Corp., 40 S.E.C. 927 (1961). It also appears in the arguments made 
and acknowledged (but not accepted on the facts) in many judicial decisions, 
generally involving either arm's-length or two-step mergers. See, e.g., Levin v. 
Great W. Sugar Co., 406 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 848 (I969); 
Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass Co., 19 Del. Ch. 326, 167 A. 831 (Ch. 1933) 
(arm's-length transaction); Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co. 48 N.J. 450, 226 
A.2d 585 (1967). 
Where the merger involves payment for the subsidiary's assets in cash or the 
parent's senior securities, the equivalence formula effectively precludes any sharing 
of gain since giving equivalent value in such currency at the time of the merger 
deprives the seller's stockholders of any possibility of sharing in the benefits of 
the combination. Where, however, the merger involves payment in the parent's 
common stock, sharing in the gains occurs if both enterprises are valued on a 
premerger basis and the parent's stock, so valued, is the currency in which the 
subsidiary's public stockholders are paid. Cf. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 
F.2d ii (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972); Bragalini v. Biblowitz, [1973- 
1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 94,371 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 23, 
1974); Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 3Io A.2d 904, 909 (Del. Ch. 1973) (arm's- 
length merger). If the parent's stock is valued on a postmerger basis (i.e., includ- 
ing the gains) while the subsidiary's stock is valued on a premerger basis, no such 
sharing occurs. 
7 See generally Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Parent to Subsidiary, 57 VA. L. 
REV. 1223 (I.97). The uncertainty as to the standard actually applied by the courts 
stems in part from the fact that market prices are almost uniformly found inade- 
quate to measure either the contributions of the parties to the merger or the prem- 
ises on which they should be deemed to have bargained. Instead, courts have tended 
to rely on expert testimony concerning the value of the shares and securities ex- 
changed in the merger. The assumption is that in a bargain at arm's length the 
values so attested would have been recognized, and equivalents would have been 
exchanged by the parties. See Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. 
1969), aff'd, 278 A.2d 467, (Sup. Ct. 1970); David J .Greene & Co. v. Dunhill 
Int'l. Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968); Stryker & Brown v. Bon Ami., Civil No. 
1945 (Del. Ch., Mar. I6, 1964), reprinted in PLI THIRD ANNUAL INST. ON SEC. 
REG. 573 (1972); Abelow v. Symonds, 40 Del Ch. 462, 470, 184 A.2d 173, 178 (Ch. 
1962), aff'd, 41 Del. Ch. 145, 189 A.2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1963). The courts have focused 
on reconciling disagreements between presumably independent experts partly by 
resolving the numerical differences on their "merits," and partly by taking into 
account as offsets to numerical differences such nonquantifiable factors as they deem 
significant. As a result, the opinions concentrate less on devising a substantive 
standard of fairness than on determining a permissible disparity between values and 
the significance of the intangibles. See Levin v. Great W. Sugar Co., 406 F.2d III2 
(3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 848 (1969); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley 
Indus., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680 (Del. 
Ch. 1969), aff'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 
48 N.J. 450, 226 A.2d 585 (1967); Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 
262, 108 N.Y.S. 978, aff'd, 192 N.Y. 535, 84 N.E. IIII (1908). Even in that deter- 
mination, however, the courts have been ambiguous, referring either to a require- 
ment of "careful scrutiny" in parent-subsidiary mergers, Sterling v. Mayflower 
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itself; the transaction is considered fair if the public stockholders 
of the absorbed subsidiary receive cash or other consideration 
equal merely to the premerger value of the subsidiary's shares. 
In many, perhaps most, cases, the arm's-length standard is thus 
evidently expected to generate no more for the minority stock- 
holders (though of course no less) than might be realized through 
sale of individual shares to another investor in an ordinary bro- 
kerage transaction at the premerger market price. 
With this version of a fairness standard in view, it is easy to 
understand why the availability of appraisal rights under state 
law has led some courts and legislatures to regard fairness as an 
unnecessary element of protection for minority stockholders. The 
statutory right of appraisal has often been interpreted either to 
foreclose fairness challenges altogether 38 or to limit their permis- 
sible scope,39 whether the challenge is presented in a suit to enjoin 
a proposed merger, to unscramble a completed transaction, or to 
obtain money damages. These restrictive interpretations may be 
appropriate if the fairness challenge raises the question only of 
how much S is worth apart from the merger; under that limited 
view, an injunction, recission, or a damage award to all stockhold- 
ers may well be too harsh a form of relief where appraisal is avail- 
able for dissatisfied individual stockholders. The more funda- 
mental issue, however, is whether the fairness challenge implicates 
so narrow a question. 
Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d o17, IIo (Sup. Ct. 1952), or to the need 
to find a disparity "so gross as to indicate bad faith," Cole v. National Cash Credit 
Ass'n, i8 Del. Ch. 47, 59, I56 A. I83, i88 (Ch. I93I), or "fraud," Mitchell v. 
Highland-Western Glass Co., I9 Del. Ch. 326, 330, 167 A. 831, 833 (Ch. I933), 
in mergers between unrelated enterprises. Cf. Skelly v. Dockweiler, 75 F. Supp. ii 
(S.D. Cal. I947). 
38 See Lattin, A Reappraisal of Appraisal Statutes, 38 MICH. L. REV. II65 
(1940); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 
77 HARV. L. REV. 1189, I207 (I964). 
39 Some authorities indicate that although appraisal rights do not preclude a 
challenge for fairness, see Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 120-23; Note, Interplay of 
Rights of Stockholders Dissenting from Sale of Corporate Assets, 58 COLUM. L. 
REV. 251, 255 (I958), their existence should increase the challenger's burden of 
demonstrating that the terms are unfair, or might even alter the definition of fair- 
ness, so that a merger price which would be unfair in the absence of an appraisal 
remedy might be fair because of its availability. See Lattin, supra note 38, at 
1169-70, 1172-74; Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1215-16. This view is to be con- 
trasted with the notion, early articulated but not often accepted, that the appraisal 
remedy was designed as an alternative only to a legal, and equitably fair proposal 
and not to an unlawful or inequitable proposal. See, e.g., Colgate v. United 
States Leather Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 72, 98, 67 A. 657, 668 (Ch. I907), rev'd on 
other grounds, 75 N.J. Eq. 229, 72 A. 126 (Ct. Err. & App. I909). If the remedy 
of appraisal were fashioned as an alternative to a valid merger proposal, it is in- 
congruous to use its availability as the basis for diluting the protection provided by 
the requirement of an equitable merger. See Lattin, supra note i8, at 247-51; 
Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 557 (I927). 
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Our own view is that broader issues are involved and that 
the relevant fiduciary norm merits basic reexamination, at least 
in the case of parent-subsidiary mergers. As indicated below, we 
think that the existing standard of fairness - essentially, an ap- 
praisal standard which focuses on the premerger value of the 
subsidiary - is insufficient and inequitable in those cases in 
which the merger itself is a valuable transaction, that is, where 
merger generates a larger aggregate value than the sum of P and 
S taken separately. Such a possibility, moreover, suggests that 
appraisal and fairness challenges can have independent functions, 
so that the availability of the former need not in any way affect 
the availability or application of the latter. 
B. Alternative Fairness Standards 
In considering alternatives to the existing law, our effort will 
be to contrast the fiduciary premises which seem to underlie each 
such alternative with those of present law, and then to show in 
specific terms how the contrasting conceptions of fiduciary obli- 
gation lead to differences in actual result. As indicated, the situ- 
ation to be considered is one in which P acquires a controlling 
stock interest in S (by whatever means) and then proceeds to 
operate S as a subsidiary. Ultimately, after a more or less ex- 
tended period of affiliation, P elects to merge S into itself, paying 
off S's public stockholders in stock, debt or cash or some com- 
bination of the three. In these circumstances, what constitutes 
fair treatment of the public stockholders? 
To focus our inquiry, let us assume that the stock of P (which 
owns 50.0I percent of S) sells at io times current earnings of 
$12 a share, or $I20, just prior to the announcement of the 
merger, and S stock sells at io times current earnings of 50 cents 
a share, or $5. P has i million shares outstanding; S has 2 mil- 
lion-plus shares outstanding, of which the public owns i million 
and P owns the balance. P's total income and stock value are 
thus $12 million and $I20 million. S's public shares earn $5oo,- 
ooo and are worth $5 million; and the sum of the separate values 
of the publicly owned shares of P and S is $125 million. Let us 
further assume that a merger between P and S will produce an 
enterprise worth $I35 million; for whatever reason -cost econ- 
omies, tax savings, or other benefits which are realized solely by 
virtue of the merger - P's decision to merge with S has produced 
an increment of $Io million in the expected combined value of 
the two corporations.40 The obvious issue of fairness is how this 
40 The example could also be framed in what may be more familiar terms. If 
prior to acquisition of a 50% interest in S, P's price-earnings ratio were 30, and 
S's were io, and if P's multiplier were to remain unchanged, then the acquisition 
would produce a gain of $io million arising from the application of P's multiplier 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.126 on Tue, 13 May 2014 19:16:32 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
3I4 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:297 
increment should be divided between P and the public stock- 
holders of S. 
The solution to this sharing problem depends entirely on what 
the concept of fiduciary obligation - which P is uniformly said 
to owe S-should be understood to mean in this context. In 
making a bargain between parent and subsidiary, is management 
free to consider that its primary duty is to one entity - presum- 
ably the parent - and that its duty to the other is of a secondary 
order? Or does fiduciary obligation imply an equal standard of 
responsibility, with neither entity having a superior claim to 
management's best efforts? 
As we have noted, the answer generally given in the past has 
been that the subsidiary's public stockholders are entitled to no 
less, but no more, than the value of what they are asked to sur- 
render in the merger -in effect, the usual "give-get" test of a 
simulated arm's-length bargain applies. Since the value of the 
"give" side of the equation is taken to be the value of S's publicly 
held stock apart from the merger, the consequence is that the $io 
million increment is allocated exclusively to P. The S stockhold- 
ers would therefore be entitled to no more than $5 million in value 
if paid in bonds or cash for the i million shares of S surrendered. 
If paid in common stock, they would receive roughly 38,462 
shares of P on the exchange. P's stock after merger would be 
worth $I30 per share, and the S stockholders would then hold P 
shares with a total value of $5 million. S's outside stockholders 
would thus be fully compensated for the premerger value of their 
shares, but they would receive no portion of the gain resulting 
from the merger transaction itself. 
The premises which underlie this outcome seem to be that 
the S stockholders have lost their bargaining rights and rights to 
independent representation in negotiating with P, and that man- 
agement's duty "to do its best" is an obligation that runs princi- 
pally, if not exclusively, to the parent corporation. To be sure, 
management has a duty to the subsidiary and its stockholders as 
well, since the merger transaction is effectively self-dealing. But 
that duty appears to require only that management refrain from 
paying less than the appraisal price for the public's shares. It 
does not embrace an obligation to seek for S or its public stock- 
holders any portion of the merger gains, notwithstanding its 
of 30 to the portion of S's income stream ($500,000) attributable to P's ownership, 
which we may assume would be distributed to P in dividends. That increment 
would be reflected in the premerger value of P. A subsequent merger would pro- 
duce an additional $io million increase in the capitalized value of the two com- 
panies, resulting from the application of P's multiplier to the $500,000 income 
stream it acquires through the merger from S's public shareholders. 
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formulation as an obligation to engage in the equivalent of arm's- 
length bargaining. One can characterize both of management's 
obligations - to parent and subsidiary -as "fiduciary," but it 
seems quite clear that they entail different levels of fidelity, at 
least in outcome.41 
Indeed, this version of arm's-length may well assume (though 
without saying so) that the parties to the bargain are really P 
and the individual minority stockholders of S, rather than S itself. 
If the negotiation is viewed as involving P and the scattered S 
stockholders, it is perhaps understandable why the prevailing 
fiduciary standard should entitle the latter to no more than they 
would get through the sale of their individual holdings on the 
market. But perhaps the question of "parties," or at least the 
identity of the selling party should be reconsidered. Instead of a 
bargain between P and the individual stockholders of S, perhaps 
the arm's-length concept should be taken to imply a transaction 
between the two firms, much as if the absorption of S by P were 
really an ordinary merger in which neither company owned a 
controlling interest in the other. One would then be led to pic- 
ture two independent bargaining agents negotiating with each 
other over an acceptable price or exchange rate for S's assets, 
both fully aware that the combination will result in an increase 
in aggregate value42 and that the consent of each bargainer is 
equally necessary to the realization of that increment. In effect, 
under this version the two entities are assumed to be dealing at 
arm's length, each represented by a manager who is duty bound 
to bargain diligently before consenting to submit the merger plan 
to his own stockholders.43 
41A comparable difference is implicit in the notion, suggested by a growing 
body of Delaware cases, that where the public security holders of the subsidiary 
are formally accorded the same treatment as the parent (e.g., dividend payments 
which are pro rata), the transaction is not to be regarded as a "self-dealing" 
transaction to be assessed by the test of "intrinsic fairness," but rather is to be 
regarded like an arm's-length transaction, to be evaluated by the business judgment 
test. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721-22, (Del. I971); 
Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. I970); Singer v. Creole 
Petroleum Corp., 297 A.2d 440, 442 (Del. Ch. 1972), modified on other grounds, 
321 A.2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d i88, 192 (Del. Ch. I97I). 
To regard similarity of formal treatment as inhibiting the inquiry into whether there 
is substantive inequality of treatment has even less basis in fiduciary theory than 
does the denial of a sharing obligation in mergers. 
42 To assume complete independence of the parties implies disparities in infor- 
mation which would pose a problem in valuation proceedings-what information 
or plans of one company should be deemed to be known to the other? If all the 
buyer's knowledge and plans are imputed to the seller, the buyer will be deprived 
of legitimate discovery values. If less than full knowledge is imputed, the question 
arises as to how much, or what items of knowledge should be imputed. 
43 For an acute analysis of the difficulties confronting courts in making such 
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Even this version of the arm's-length standard presents prob- 
lems, however. Although the concept of a bargain between two 
companies calls for a sharing on some basis of the gain expected 
to result from the merger, it leads to no unique solution to the 
problem of fair division. Any sharing of the expected gain which 
leaves both parties better off is conceivable, but the actual out- 
come would depend on relative negotiating skills, individual ex- 
pectations, adequacy of information, and other indeterminate 
variables. Moreover, while a solution based on the difference in 
size between P and S - perhaps through comparing stock values 
or income streams - has some appeal,44 the relevance of a size 
factor in an arm's-length bargain is presumably slight where each 
party has (or is deemed to have) an absolute veto over the merger 
proposal.45 
In the end, a mediator might decide that the only feasible 
outcome is one which divides the merger gain equally between 
the two firms by awarding $5 million to each.46 While that re- 
sult is no more likely than any other to be the outcome of a real 
negotiation, from the mediator's standpoint it does at least give 
an appearance of neutrality and evenhandedness. If we adopt 
this notion as our fiduciary premise, P would ultimately receive 
$7.5 million of the $io million gain -$5 million directly, and, 
because of its 50 percent ownership of S, $2.5 million of the 
$5 million allocated to S. The S public shareholders, if paid in 
bonds or cash, would receive $7.5 million for surrendering their 
i million shares- $5 million for the premerger value of the 
shares and $2.5 million as their share of the increment. If paid 
in common stock, they would receive roughly 58,823 shares of P 
on the exchange. P's stock after merger would be worth $I27.50 
per share, and the S stockholders would hold P shares with a 
assumptions see Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry., 78 F. Supp. 312, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 
1948) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 919 (I949). 
44Studies of mergers of listed companies suggest that the ratio in which they 
share in the merged enterprise has tended to correlate with the ratio of the market 
prices of the stocks of the two enterprises (during the period preceeding the an- 
nouncement of the merger) more closely than with the ratios of any other relevant 
variables. Compare L. DELLENBARGER, COMMON STOCK VALUATION IN INDUSTRIAL 
MERGERS 73-83 (I966), with Bosland, Stock Valuation in Recent Mergers, 94 
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 516, 518-24, 583-90, 662-69 (I955). But cf. Halpern, supra 
note 22, at 568-73 (equal division between larger and smaller firms). Reference to 
the results of apparently arm's-length transactions to set a norm for the imputed 
bargain is limited by the qualification that side payments may in fact be con- 
cealed in the price. See note 92 infra. 
45 Cf. Dravosburg Land Co. v. Scott, 340 Pa. 280, 281-83, i6 A.2d 415, 416-17 
(I940). 
46 See Halpern, supra note 22, at 573; Mossin, Merger Agreements: Some Game- 
Theoretic Considerations, 41 J. Bus. 460, 466 (I968). 
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total value of $7-5 million. Thus, the dollar value of the merger 
would be $2.50 per share to the public shareholders of S and $7.50 
per share to P. By contrast, under the appraisal standard which is 
supported by many of the decided cases, the dollar value of the 
merger to the P stockholders would be $io per share, and to the 
S stockholders zero. 
Which of the two outcomes just compared should be adopted? 
It seems plain that a rule which allocates nothing to the minority 
interest in respect to the merger gain is unfair; surely S makes 
some contribution to the increase in total value which entitles 
the public stockholders to a share of the return. But we also think 
it arbitrary to insist that the uncertainties which would attach to 
a true arm's-length bargain between independent managers be 
resolved by an equal division of the gain. Since the outcome of 
an actual negotiation could fall at any point on a wide range, the 
equal division rule merely pretends to find a determinate solution 
where none exists. 
At all events, the plain fact is that P and S are not at arm's 
length and it seems incongruous to treat them as if they were. 
Thus, if the two companies were truly unaffiliated, each manage- 
ment's knowledge of the other enterprise and its possibilities 
would be limited, and in particular the subsidiary's insight into 
the plans of the parent and the uses it contemplates for the sub- 
sidiary's assets would be merely speculative. Any valuation rest- 
ing upon an imputed arm's-length bargain would therefore have 
to reflect an assumed disparity in information between the two 
companies.47 But such a simulated solution would be inconsistent 
with the actuality that P and S are jointly managed. Moreover, 
any effort to impute to P an undisclosed perception about the 
gains to be derived from combining the two entities is presumably 
contrary to existing rules on insider trading.48 Hence, although 
47 See Heyman, Implications of Rule I45 Under the Securities Act of 1933, 53 
B.U. L. REV. 785, 8I2-I3 (I973). 
48 The two companies have been operated as part of a single controlling group, 
so that the management of each enterprise must be deemed to know everything 
about the other. If the enterprises are not in fact being operated as a common 
pool of assets, they are at least the beneficiaries of a common pool of information 
about each other. And those in control owe as much obligation to the one enter- 
prise as to the other to disclose all relevant information. To allow the parent to 
make an exchange on the basis of knowledge it has about the subsidiary which it 
acquired by reason of its control and does not disclose to the public is, therefore, 
to permit insider trading. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. 
N.Y. 1969), aff'd in relevant part, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. I973). In contrast, any 
knowledge about the acquired company which the acquiring company learns in an 
arm's-length transaction comes, presumably, from its own efforts, and it is entitled 
to the benefit of its discovery of those values. Cf. Heyman, supra note 47, at 813; 
Schneider & Manko, Rule 45, 5 REV. SEC. REG. 8II, 815 (1972). But cf. Feit v. 
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the arm's-length bargain concept is inequitable if it leads to an 
appraisal standard of fairness, if used to support an equal divi- 
sion of merger benefits or any other determinate formula, it is 
arbitrary both in theory and in application.49 
The shortcomings of the arm's-length bargain analogy sug- 
gest that it may be more appropriate to emphasize the joint 
character of management's responsibility to the stockholders of 
the two entities than to postulate a fictional bargain at arm's 
length. What ought to be stressed, we think, is not the idea of 
a make-believe bargain between strangers, but the fact that a 
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 549, 563-66 (E.D.N.Y. 
I971). 
49 In addition to the indeterminacy in theory implicit in any effort to ascertain 
how two independent negotiators would divide the gain, there are indeterminacies 
in application whenever any effort is made to simulate an arm's-length bargain 
over assets or services for which there is no readily ascertainable market price. 
Thus, to determine the fairness of merger terms not fixed by arm's-length bar- 
gaining, the courts rely on the testimony of experts of uncertain independence, 
who can only provide approximations, and must attribute to each enterprise a wide 
range of values, at any one of which an exchange would be fair. Thus, the stock 
of Enterprise A, valued at between 20 and 23, which is being merged into Enter- 
prise B having stock values between 40 and 44, may be exchanged "fairly" on the 
basis of a value of 20 for Enterprise A and 44 for Enterprise B (approximately I 
for .45 shares). The transaction would be equally fair if the respective values were 
23 and 40 (approximately I for .57 shares). And courts are unable -either theo- 
retically or practically - to determine where, if anywhere, within these ranges prices 
cease to be acceptable. See Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry., 78 F. Supp. 312, 316-17 
(S.D.N.Y. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 919 (1949); cf. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 
461 F.2d II, 28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972) (use of market values 
to establish "a tolerable range of fairness"). If the merger parties are assumed to be 
unrelated, the acceptable range of values is limited only by the "business judgment" 
of the bargainers- a judgment seldom questioned by the courts. See, e.g., Gimbel 
v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 6o1 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Sup. Ct. 
1974); Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch. 262, 279-80, 92 A.2d 311, 
321 (Ch. 1952); Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass Co., 19 Del. Ch. 326, 330-31, 
167 A. 831, 833 (Ch. 1933); Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 
56, I56 A. 183, 187-88 (Ch. 1931); cf. Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1215-16. The 
"presumption [of] . . . sound business judgment" (which is rebutted only by ap- 
parently fraudulent conduct) has been held inapplicable when parent-subsidiary 
mergers are challenged; instead the test becomes "intrinsic fairness," which is deter- 
mined by "careful scrutiny." David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 
427, 43I (Del. Ch. 1968). However, no specific criteria have been offered for deter- 
mining the "intrinsic fairness" of a merger price. See Comment, The Corporate 
Fiduciary Duty Doctrine and the Requirement of Fairness in Parent-Subsidiary 
Relations, 76 DICK. L REV. 237, 250-65 (1971). The results of the cases suggest 
that the difference between the two standards is not significant, although it is pos- 
sible that judicial articulation of the difference inhibits those who negotiate parent- 
subsidiary mergers more than those who corrupt "independent" management with 
side payments. Certainly the judicial valuation proceeding produces a "fair" price 
which is at best only a crude approximation of the arm's-length bargain for which 
it purports to be a proxy. 
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single management team is in charge of both enterprises, and 
that its ultimate responsibility is to the individual investors who 
own those companies' shares.50 Taking that view, a more fitting 
analogy is to the legal responsibility of a trustee who under- 
takes to manage two (or more) trust accounts on behalf of 
separate beneficiaries having similar financial objectives. Where 
a profitable opportunity has been discovered - here the merger 
-the question that arises would not be one of improper self- 
dealing on the part of the fiduciary, for which an arm's-length 
standard might indeed be appropriate. Rather, the issue to be 
resolved would be how, or whether, a single fiduciary acting on 
behalf of multiple beneficiaries should be required to apportion 
among them the tangible benefits which his management skills 
produce. Suppose- to use a somewhat fanciful illustration - 
that a trustee has discretionary authority to manage two ac- 
counts: the first, belonging to beneficiary A, has assets of $Ioo; 
the second, belonging to beneficiary B, has assets of $50. The 
trustee determines that a cost-saving of $io can be realized if 
both accounts are joined in a single administrative unit. The 
question is how that saving should be apportioned by the trustee 
so as to comply with his fiduciary obligations to A and B. 
It is too plain for argument that the $io saving must be shared 
on some basis between A and B, and cannot be allocated solely to 
either - at least in the absence of agreement or demonstrable 
expectations to the contrary. Each beneficiary has a claim on the 
trustee's management skill, a claim which is entitled to recogni- 
tion in some amount; neither can be wholly excluded from par- 
ticipation in the gain from the combination. On the other hand, 
a 50-50 apportionment of the expected gain is unwarranted be- 
cause such a division would produce for B twice the percentage 
return on his investment account that A would get on his. Thus, 
if each account were credited with $5, B would earn a io percent 
return while A would earn only 5 percent. To be sure, the dollar 
return to both would be the same, but such an outcome seems to 
be unreasonable when A has twice as many dollars under manage- 
ment as B. The only sensible view of the trustee's obligation, we 
50 Even if different persons occupy decision making roles in the parent and in 
the subsidiary, the parent's management is as much the loyal and dedicated repre- 
sentative of the subsidiary's public stockholders as it is of the parent's. Cf. Jones 
v. A.F. Ahmanson & Co., i Cal. 3d 93, 115 n.I4, 460 P.2d 464, 476 n.I4, 8i Cal. 
Rptr. 592, 604 n.I4 (1969) (parent owes same fiduciary duty to own shareholders 
as to those of subsidiary). But cf. Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, I57, 
22i A.2d 47, 492-93 (Sup. Ct. I966). See generally Note, Corporate Fiduciary 
Doctrine in the Context of Parent-Subsidiary Relations, 74 YALE L.J. 338 (I964). 
See also Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry., 78 F. Supp. 3I2, 315-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (L. 
Hand, J.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 919 (I949). 
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think, is one which promises each beneficiary the same return per 
dollar of resources managed, and this in turn requires that the 
administrative saving 51 be allocated on the basis of relative ac- 
count size. Thus A should receive $6.67, and B, $3.33, of the 
anticipated $o1 gain, each thereby obtaining a 6 percent return 
on his investment. That indeed is the principle which determines 
the allocation of investment opportunities in the administration 
of common trust funds.52 
51 Such an allocation of the saving is unaffected by the different risk preferences 
of the investors. This may be seen if we assume the case of an investment man- 
ager with two discretionary accounts. Account A has assets of $ioo and the owner 
wants a relatively safe 6% return. Account B has assets of $80 and B seeks a 
relatively risky IO% return. The manager accordingly has fashioned different sets 
of stocks in each account in an effort to meet the owner's goal. The question is: 
how should the $io saving, posited in the illustration in the text, be divided between 
A and B? One possible answer is that since B ($80) wants a o0% return, B 
should get $8 with the balance of $2 to A. Or, since A ($ioo) wants a 6% re- 
turn, A should get $6 and B the remaining $4. The two answers are equally 
plausible. But the fact that A is a 6% financier while B is a io% financier really 
has no bearing on their relative claims to the windfall. Once the windfall has 
been identified, it is simply the equivalent of cash. Each party is entitled to some 
share of it, and each has an equal claim per dollar of resources entrusted to man- 
agement. Hence A should get $5.55 (5/9 of $io) and B, $4.45 (4/9 of io). Neither 
risk classes nor rates of return become relevant in determining the propriety of 
the division of a determinate saving, however relevant they may be in determining 
the allocation of future investment opportunities. See note 66 infra. 
52 See, e.g., Collective Investment Regulations of Comptroller of the Currency, 
12 C.F.R. ? 9.18(3) (1973); TRUST Div. AM. BANKERS ASS'N, COMMON TRUST 
FUNDS: A HANDBOOK ON THEIR PURPOSES, ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION 79-82 
(2d ed. 1948) (App. D, Suggested Plan Art. V); cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 ? 
584(c) (taxable income includes proportionate share of income from common trust 
fund whether or not distributed). 
Professional investment advisers are confronted with a similar problem in 
determining how to allocate fairly among their advisees investment information, 
purchases of securities which are desirable but scarce, sales of undesirable securities, 
or purchases or sales of investments which can only be purchased or sold at 
different prices. Although authoritative answers have not been spelled out in de- 
tail, see, e.g., 2 SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., ist Sess. 372-73 (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS STUDY]; I SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL 
STUDY OF SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 
ist Sess. 371-74 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY]; Henderson, Conflicts 
of Interest for the Money Manager, PLI THIRD ANNUAL INST. ON SEC. REG. 293, 
299 (I972); Herman & Safanda, Allocating Investment Information, I973 FIN. 
ANAL. J. 23; Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Department Activities, 82 YALE 
L.J. 977, 992-94 (I973); Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Department Activi- 
ties; Seven Gaps, Eight Remedies, 2 SEC. REG. L.J. I22, I49-54 (I974), the Securi- 
ties and Exchange Commission has indicated that a wide variety of allocation 
practices are used. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra, at 330-87; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
STUDY, supra, at 348-59. A predominant but far from exclusive practice is to al- 
locate the investment (or disinvestment) opportunities in proportion either to the 
amounts ordered, or to the sizes of the various accounts. See, e.g., INSTITUTIONAL 
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If the same considerations which govern (or ought to govern) 
the duty of the trustee in the illustration above are allowed to 
control in our parent-subsidiary merger example, the effect will 
be to divide the merger gain equally - not on a dollar basis, as 
already noted, but as a percentage of premerger values. With 
S shares worth $5 prior to merger and P shares worth $120, 
the rule of "proportionate sharing" that we have just described 
would entitle the S stockholders to receive the premerger value 
of their S shares ($5 million) plus 5/I25ths of the $io million 
of appreciation expected to result from the merger itself, or 
$400,000. The S stockholders would thus receive $5.4 million 
in value if paid in bonds or cash. If paid in common stock, they 
would receive roughly 41,667 shares of P on the exchange. With 
I,04I,667 shares of P outstanding after the merger, each P share 
would be worth $I29.60, and the S stockholders would then hold 
P shares with a total value of $5.4 million. 
On this approach, $9.6 million of the $io million merger incre- 
ment is allocated to the P stockholders and $.4 million to the 
S minority. The result is that both sets of stockholders earn an 8 
INVESTORS STUDY, supra, at 348-55, 782. In the case of mutual fund complexes a 
proportionate allocation formula for purchases is used often enough to be char- 
acterized as "typical." See Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 
U. PA. L. REV. 205, 237-38 (1970); Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent 
Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 236 (1971). But cf. Glazer, supra, at 219-26. 
Similar formulas have been suggested for banks. Herman & Safanda, supra, at 23, 90. 
Although some authorities point to a fiduciary standard which precludes sys- 
tematic allocation or denial of investment opportunities to particular accounts, at 
least in the absence of agreement, demonstrable expectation or other relevant basis 
for distinguishing among advisees, see, e.g., Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. 
Supp. 1076, 1082-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 15i6 & 
n.I22 (2d ed. 1961), discussing SEC v. Todd, 15 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 161 (D. 
Mass. 1946), neither authority nor practice yet points to a single sharing formula 
for the allocation of investment opportunities among several constituencies. Much 
of the prevailing ambiguity stems from uncertainties inherent in the need to 
consider individual variations among accounts, differing risk and return prefer- 
ences, and promises or expectations of favorable treatment. See Henderson, 
supra, at 293-314; Leiman, Conflicts of Interests and Related Problems of Broker 
Dealers and Investment Advisers, PLI FIRST ANNUAL INST. ON SEC. REG. 323, 330-40 
(1970). Because of the scope of variations in individual accounts and the uncer- 
tainty as to whether any particular opportunity can be said to "fit" any particular 
investor, no single investment decision can be said to operate fairly or unfairly or 
to depart from a rule of proportionality, since it may be justified on grounds 
peculiar to the investment and account involved at the time of decision. More- 
over, it may be possible to compensate in a later transaction for impossibility or 
failure in sharing an advantage in an earlier transaction. Hence, in order to de- 
termine whether allocation is being appropriately executed in accordance with a 
proportionate division formula, it is necessary to examine the adviser's behavior 
in a large number of cases over a fairly long period of time. Cf. Henderson, supra, 
at 308; Leiman, supra, at 332. 
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percent return on their investment as a result of the merger- 
$9.6o/$I20 for P's owners, and $o.4o/$5 for the public stock- 
holders of S - so that an equal dollar investment in either stock 
will generate the same return. The outcome is thus a fair one in 
the respect that all investors to whom management has an obli- 
gation of trust are treated alike. 
In summary, the fiduciary obligation may be envisioned in the 
present setting in three possible forms. The first - which reflects 
the prevailing body of law - apparently assumes direct arm's- 
length dealings between P (the entity) and the individual mi- 
nority stockholders of S. Such dealings are considered fair if the 
price paid for the minority shares is equal to their premerger 
value--$5 per share in our illustration- even though a gain 
results from the merger itself which is retained in full by P. The 
second alternative assumes that the dealings are between P and 
an uncontrolled S, with each entity being represented by an inde- 
pendent bargaining agent. On that assumption a wide range of 
outcomes is possible, and no single outcome seems to be dictated. 
If a fair bargain would entail an equal dollar division of the 
merger gain, the S stockholders would receive $7.50 per share, 
which represents the premerger value of their stock in S plus their 
share of the half of the merger increment allocated to S. Finally, 
the third version of fiduciary duty (and the one here urged) en- 
tirely discards the idea of dealings between P and S or its stock- 
holders. What is emphasized instead is the duty of management 
to treat all stockholders alike by giving each an equal return on 
his investment, whether that investment is in the shares of P or 
the shares of S.53 Under this formulation the allocation of values 
is fair if the S stockholders receive the premerger value of their 
shares ($5) plus 5/I25ths of the gain attributable to the merger 
($0.40), or $5.40 per share. This method provides a determinate 
or unique solution to the sharing problem and avoids the dif- 
53The duty to treat the subsidiary's public stockholders equally with the 
parent's stockholders would be altered if it could be shown that the subsidiary's 
public stockholders had consented to, or in some way expected exposure to the 
risk of unrestrained, unilaterally determined transactions between their enterprise 
and another enterprise which later acquires control of theirs. There is no evidence, 
however, that such risks enter into the pricing of a corporation's stock either when 
originally issued or when later traded (before it becomes a subsidiary). But see 
David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971) 
(constructive notice to minority stockholder that he may be eliminated may be 
considered in valuation of stock). See also Folk, Conflicts of Interest Under State 
Law, PLI THIRD ANNUAL INST. ON SEC. REG. I79, 185-91 (1972); Note, The 
Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine in the Context of Parent Subsidiary Relations, 74 
YALE L.J. 338 (1964). 
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ficulties inherent in the artificial assumption that dealing between 
P and S takes place at arm's length.54 
Apart from whether particular circumstances may justify or 
require departure from the formula,55 the problems of practical 
implementation that can be foreseen seem not much greater than 
under present law. Where the stockholders of S receive stock of 
P in the merger, the proposed formula is satisfied by an exchange 
of shares based on the premerger value of each entity. A payout 
in the form of debt or cash, however, would make it necessary to 
place a value not merely on the shares of each entity before the 
merger, but on the combined entity after the merger in order to 
ascertain whether the S minority is adequately compensated.56 
54 In analogous circumstances courts have not obligated the parent to share 
with its subsidiary the saving derived from filing consolidated federal income tax 
returns in which the subsidiary's loss offsets the parent's income. See, e.g., Meyer- 
son v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789 (Del. Ch. I967); Greenbaum v. 
American Metal Climax, Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 225, 320, 278 N.Y.S.2d I23, I29 
(I967); Case v. New York Cent. R.R., I5 N.Y.2d I50, 204 N.E.2d 643, 256 
N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965) (upholding contractual allocation of trivial part of tax benefit 
to subsidiary); cf. Western Pac. R.R. v. Western Pac. Ry., I97 F.2d 994, Io002-04 
(9th Cir. 1951), rehearing denied, 206 F.2d 495, 498 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 246 
U.S. 9IO (I953) (upholding subsidiary's enjoyment of the entire tax benefit. But see 
Alliegro v. Pan American Bank, 136 So. 2d 656, 658-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. I962), 
aff'd mem., 149 So. 2d 45 (I963). As Professor Cary has pointed out, the decisions 
are egregiously at fault in awarding the entire benefit to the corporation with the 
otherwise taxable income and in failing to require sharing. See generally Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate Law; Some Reflections on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 
679-83 (1974). It is a mindless misconception to treat the subsidiary as con- 
tributing nothing to the tax saving and therefore as being entitled to no part of 
the benefit. The tax loss which the subsidiary gives up is no less an asset than 
tangible property. Although its value may be considerably more difficult to ascer- 
tain, that difficulty hardly justifies denying it any share in the gain. Indeed, to the 
extent that the courts' refusal to recognize a sharing requirement rests on judicial 
inability to determine how to divide the benefits, the formula offered in the text 
should eliminate that prop for erroneous decisions and offer a solution for division 
of the benefits. Since the tax saving, like the merger gain, cannot be realized by 
either corporation acting alone, fairness should require a proportionate sharing of 
the benefit, based on relative stock values, presumably determined at the close 
of the taxable year. P would still elect to file on a consolidated basis, no doubt, 
but the exercise of "business judgment" which that election reflects, instead of 
being entirely costless to P, would bear what seems to us to be an appropriate 
charge. The calculations are not without complexity, but again it does not follow 
that the subsidiary is therefore entitled to nothing. The problem, in short, is not 
to decide to whom the "opportunity" belongs, but how to share it. 
55 Cf. Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 3I4 A.2d 216, 221-22 (Del. Ch. I973). 
5 The distribution of forms of limited participation in the enterprise to out- 
siders or the public while the parent retains the residual equity interest increases 
the likelihood of disadvantageous and unpreventable inequality in the treatment of 
public security holders. Not only are tax burdens imposed upon public security 
holders, but payment in disparate forms makes it peculiarly difficult to test fairness 
or equivalence as between the risk-return combinations surrendered and received 
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Since the premise of common control precludes concealment of 
information by either party, earnings expectations or hidden re- 
sources of the subsidiary may not be as easily obscured as on the 
assumption of an arm's-length bargain. To the extent that fuller 
disclosure may be required, some of the problems of valuation 
heretofore encountered by courts in testing the fairness of merg- 
ers may actually be reduced in scope. In any event, expectations 
of the gains from the merger are appropriate subjects for dis- 
closure.57 No doubt there will always remain a substantial area 
by the public, or as between the interest received by the public and that received by 
the parent, since the variables to be compared have been altered. And the likeli- 
hood of disadvantage to the outsiders is increased as those comparisons are made 
more difficult, because the insiders inevitably have a clearer vision of the earnings 
and risk expected in the future of the enterprise than do the outsiders, but can 
obscure it in the presentation - both to stockholders and in court. 
Although historically the freeze-out has been primarily a problem for stock- 
holders of close corporations, in recent years it has become a fashionable device 
in public mergers (the insiders forcing out the outsiders by merging the enterprise 
with a dummy) and in takeovers (the bidder offering senior securities to the 
common stockholders and then merging out the remaining stockholders with senior 
securities). When the freeze-out is an incident to an arm's-length merger with 
another business -either in one step or in a second step following a purchase of 
control - considerations of efficiency suggest that the problem of fairness to those 
frozen out may most appropriately be solved only by pressing for payment of 
fully adequate values, notwithstanding that the difficulties encountered in achiev- 
ing such a solution have impelled requests for a more extreme remedy, such as 
a categorical prohibition against distributing different forms of participation to 
the public than are distributed to insiders, compare Kellogg v. Georgia-Pacific Paper 
Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719, 724-25 (W.D. Ark. I964), with Alcott v. Hyman, 40 
Del. Ch. 449, 184 A.2d 90 (Ch. I962), aff'd, 42 Del. Ch. 233, 244-45, 208 A.2d 
501, 508 (Sup. Ct. 1965), and Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 
514, 5i6-2I, I54 A.2d 893, 896-97 (Sup. Ct. I959). But when, as in the currently 
fashionable efforts to "go private," the freeze-out is in substance only an internal 
reorganization, whether by merger with a controlled company or otherwise, there 
is less basis for urging considerations of efficiency (at least in public corporations) 
to require a selective rule which would permit transactions found on the facts to 
be fair, and every consideration of equity argues for a categorical prohibition 
against the freeze-out. See In re San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 52 Cal. App. 
2d 814, 820-24, I27 P.2d 29, 34-36 (I942); Outwater v. Public Service Corp., I03 
N.J. Eq. 461, I43 A. 729 (I928), aff'd, 146 A. 916 (I929); cf. Eisenberg v. Central 
Zone Property Corp., 306 N.Y. 58, II5 N.E.2d 652 (I953). But cf. Willcox v. 
Stern, i8 N.Y.2d I95, 219 N.E.2d 401, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38 (I966). In either case, 
claims for relief are being made under rule Iob-5 with some success, Levine v. 
Biddle Sawyer Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 94,816 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 
I7, 1974); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. Io62 (N.D. Ga. I972), 
aff'd on other grounds, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974), although the relevance of 
the "deception" said to be practiced on the minority is hard to detect. Grimes v. 
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 94,722 
(N.D. Fla., July 15, I974); Krafcisin v. Lasalle Madison Hotel Co., [I972-I973 
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 93,586 (N.D. Ill. I972). 
57 See note 48 supra. 
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for dispute about estimates of the future or about appropriate 
capitalization rates, and the parent's experts will always have 
insiders' advantages over dissident stockholders' experts in prof- 
ering such evidence. But the expanding obligation to disclose 
will curtail those advantages by increasing the risk to the parent 
if it predicates the merger terms on assumptions about the future 
which rest upon past or present conditions that were not ade- 
quately set forth.58 
C. Implications of the Sharing Concept 
for "Corporate Opportunities" 
Especially in an era of conglomerate diversification, the ques- 
tion of how new business opportunities should be allocated be- 
tween P and S while both are operated as separate entities has 
proved troublesome. In doctrinal terms the issue is usually pre- 
sented as one of "corporate opportunity." Although the focus in 
the preceding discussion has been on merger transactions, to the 
extent that our revised notion of what is fair in mergers may help 
to solve problems of corporate opportunities arising between par- 
ent and subsidiary, we think that a digression on that subject is 
merited. 
Typically, the corporate opportunity cases have involved of- 
ficers or directors and the courts have applied an all-or-nothing 
rule; if the opportunity does not belong to the corporation, the 
officer or director may take it.59 The doctrine, in short, has been 
a mechanism for disciplining officers and directors by entirely 
denying to them whatever is found to be a corporate opportunity, 
and allowing them to keep entirely for themselves that which is 
not such an opportunity. To the extent - and it is considerable 
-that the case law involves closely-held corporations and claimed 
usurpation by officers or directors, the problem differs from that 
created when a publicly-held parent corporation is charged with 
usurping a corporate opportunity of a publicly-held subsidiary.60 
58See Beecher v. Able, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 94,450 (S.D.N.Y., 
March 24, I974). 
59The parent-subsidiary cases have also generally allocated the opportunity 
exclusively to one entity and have tended to rely -on factors such as the subsidiary's 
legal or financial inability to accept the opportunity or on the identity of the 
offeree. See, e.g., Knauff v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 277 F. Supp. 564, 575 (D. 
Wyo. I967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 958 (Ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 831 (1969); 
Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 
(x944); cf. Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, I2I A.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. 1956); 
Young v. Columbia Oil Co., Ino W. Va. 364, I58 S.E. 678 (I93I). 
60 On the one hand, the duties of stockholding officers and directors to fellow 
stockholders may be more demanding in a close corporation than in a publicly- 
held enterprise, so that they may be more narrowly confined in acquiring business 
opportunities for themselves rather than for all the shareholders. See Note, Cor- 
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In the latter case, some sharing of the opportunity is generally 
possible; in the former case, sharing is almost never a feasible 
solution.61 Unlike the contest between a corporation, which pre- 
sumably has attracted investors by its promise or history of 
limited business operations, and an officer or director with un- 
limited scope for his personal business opportunities, the parent- 
subsidiary situation involves competing claims by two enterprises, 
each of which has a history of relatively finite operations. To 
be sure, when the parent is a conglomerate firm, the limits of 
its legitimate operations are difficult to define, but the need to 
define them becomes less significant if the opportunity can be 
divided between the two enterprises and its benefits shared by 
the two groups of public investors. Once the issue ceases to be 
"all or none," the proper disposition of particular opportunities 
can be determined by the obligations of parent to subsidiary as 
joint participants in a common venture. 
Assume a case in which P and S are engaged in easily differ- 
entiated lines of business at the time control is acquired by P- 
say oil refining for P and sporting-goods for S. Generally speak- 
ing, the existing corporate opportunity rule suggests - although 
with substantial qualifications - that growth or expansion in the 
sports field, whether through internal build-up or purchase of 
other firms, belongs exclusively to S and cannot be appropriated 
by P.62 As so applied the rule seems quite correct. The object of 
the law is, or should be, to preserve to S's stockholders the ex- 
pected returns on the risks which they assumed prior to the ac- 
quisition of control. Thus, the price-earnings ratio of S's shares 
at the date control is acquired reflects the growth expectations 
which investors attach to the sporting-goods business. If P's 
purchase of control permitted P to frustrate those expectations 
by allocating all future growth to itself, the result would be a 
decline in the price of S shares immediately after the control pur- 
chase or if not immediately, then at such later date as the per- 
mitted pattern of diversion became evident to the market. Pro- 
porate Opportunity in the Close Corporation--A Different Result?, 56 GEO. L.J. 
381, 387-91 (I967). On the other hand, officers and directors are not to be dis- 
couraged from entering business on their own, and presumably as individuals have 
a wider choice to accept new opportunities than do their corporations, whose 
opportunity sets may be viewed as more confined by the history of their prior 
operations. 
61 Cf. Note, Corporate Opportunity in the Close Corporation -A Different 
Result?, 56 GEO. L.J. 381, 385-86 (1967); Note, Corporate Opportunity, 74 HARV. 
L. REV. 765, 770-7I (I96I). 
62 Under established doctrine, legal or financial limitations inhibiting corporate 
action cast doubts on the sweep of the prohibition against officers or directors. 
These doubts, however, should not be present in the case of a parent-subsidiary 
merger, in view of the feasibility of sharing the opportunity. 
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hibiting such conduct enforces P's fiduciary duty to maintain S's 
growth expectations for the benefit of its minority stockholders. 
Any lesser prohibition would allow an uncompensated taking of 
value which belongs to the S minority, and would therefore be 
unfair to them. 
The question that remains, however, is whether the corporate 
opportunity doctrine, even as so viewed, goes far enough in meet- 
ing the legitimate claims of minority interests. For the purpose 
of illustration, three very simple hypotheticals can be added to 
the one given in the preceding paragraph: assume that (i) P 
and S are in different businesses and an opportunity arises to 
acquire a business different from either of those; or (2) P and S 
are in the same business, which can now be profitably expanded; 
or (3) P and S are in the same business and an opportunity arises 
to acquire a different business. Quite obviously, the issue is which 
of the two entities shall be entitled to take credit for the new or 
expanded business opportunity, P or S. 
In dealing with problems of this sort, the courts have largely 
carried over into the parent-subsidiary context the traditional 
approach taken to problems involving officers and directors.3 
Thus, a stockholder of S who objects to the allocation of new or 
expanded business opportunities to P must establish (at least) 
that the new business closely resembles or "fits"' with an activity 
previously carried on exclusively by S. If he fails to make that 
showing, the result in general is to permit management, in an 
exercise of "sound business judgment," to allocate the entire in- 
vestment to P alone.64 
But is this latter outcome fair to the S minority? Does equity 
require merely that the public investors be protected against the 
destruction of an expectant interest which is defined in terms of 
S's preacquisition activities only, or should the corporate oppor- 
tunity rule and its supporting concept of fiduciary obligation be 
cast in broader terms? We think that a broader fairness standard 
should apply. In each of the three hypotheticals neither P nor S 
has an exclusive claim to the fruits of management's skills; in 
the circumstances posited, the corporate opportunity is not ex- 
clusively within the line of business of either firm. Allowing 
management, under the guise of "sound business judgment," to 
allocate the opportunity solely to P suggests that management's 
primary fiduciary duty is to the P stockholders and that the S 
shareholders can claim only a secondary obligation. 
We think that this notion of two standards is incorrect. P's 
action in acquiring control of S ought not to impair the claim of 
63 See note 59 supra & note 67 infra. 
4 See Folk, supra note 53, at 179, 185-91. 
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S's stockholders to a fully managed enterprise, or result in the 
subordination of S's interest to that of P, despite management's 
evident difficulty of meeting a dual responsibility. Management 
could have acquired 0oo percent of S's assets at the outset instead 
of contenting itself with mere control. If it chooses to permit a 
minority interest to survive, however, the problem of divided 
loyalty that inevitably results should not be resolved by simply 
treating one constituency as inferior to the other. Our view is 
that, as in the case of mergers, the fruits of management's skill 
in identifying attractive investment projects should be shared 
with S's public stockholders proportionately.65 Hence, when a 
new acquisition is made which does not fall exclusively within 
the line of business of either P or S, or an expansion is undertaken 
in an area in which P and S are both engaged, the new investment 
should be allocated to S's public stockholders in the same ratio 
that the value of S's public shares bears to the total value of the 
shares of both firms. 
The result may be illustrated simply by adapting the earlier 
example. Thus, assume that at the time a new acquisition is 
identified, the aggregate value of P's shares is $I20 million while 
that of S's public shares is $5 million. Suppose the new acquisi- 
tion is expected to add $io million to the overall value of existing 
assets. Under present law the $io million increment is allocated 
entirely to P's stockholders, with no benefit whatever to the public 
stockholders of S. By contrast, under the approach taken here, 
management would be required to allocate to S itself a "partner- 
ship" interest in the new investment sufficient to afford the public 
stockholders a 5/I25ths participation. S's public shares would 
then be expected to rise to a value of $5.4 million in total, while 
P's stock - reflecting both P's direct interest in the new ac- 
quisition and its indirect interest via its 5o-plus percent owner- 
ship of S - would rise to a value of $I29.6 million. S would, of 
course, make an appropriate contribution to the cost of the ac- 
quisition, by paying cash or issuing additional securities to P. 
Acceptance of this sharing formula does not mean that line-of- 
business considerations can be dispensed with. On the contrary, 
the goal of any fairness doctrine must be that the expectations of 
P and S stockholders not be frustrated solely by reason of acquisi- 
tion of control. When the new opportunity is clearly within the 
65 To be sure, in the case of new external investment opportunities, in contrast 
to mergers, the claim of the subsidiary's public stockholders rests more on manage- 
ment's obligation to share investment opportunities with two constituencies than 
on the subsidiary's contribution to the joint opportunity. But neither the claim 
nor the obligation is any less compelling. See Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 
I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 8I Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969). 
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pre-affiliation line of business of one firm and not the other, ex- 
clusive allocation is appropriate. We mean only to add a second 
objective to be invoked when line-of-business considerations are 
not dispositive, namely, that the exercise of management skill be 
based on a principle of equal obligation to both sets of investors. 
We concede that the two goals cannot be reconciled perfectly; if, 
for example, P's management is more innovative or diversifica- 
tion-minded than the old management of S, a proportionate shar- 
ing rule might dilute the expectations of P's stockholders. If 
such dilution occurs, however, it is a consequence of P's willing- 
ness to settle for mere control rather than full ownership of S, and 
should be viewed as an additional cost for the controlling interest. 
Putting the same point differently, we do not accept the argument 
that any new business acquisition must belong to P merely be- 
cause P's "business" is diversification, that is, management. To 
accept that position would be to resurrect the primary-secondary 
concept of fiduciary duty, which we regard as essentially unfair.66 
We should add that the addition of a sharing requirement will 
not make it either easier or harder to decide the troublesome 
factual issues that often present themselves in corporate oppor- 
tunity cases, and which are perhaps inherent in any effort at in- 
dustrial classification. The question of whether a new under- 
taking is basically similar to a preexisting activity carried on 
by one but not the other of the two entities, or is instead an 
appropriate candidate for sharing, will have to be dealt with by 
the courts on the basis of subjective impression, just as is done 
at present.67 Our approach would have an impact on the disposi- 
66 If instead of looking only to lines of business, we also assume that S and P 
are in businesses with significantly different degrees of risk, the sharing formula 
we propose need not be altered. Unlike the problem of an investment adviser, who 
must take individual risk preferences into account in allocating scarce investment 
opportunities among his individual clients, corporate management, which is invest- 
ing in real assets on behalf of an operating enterprise, need make no restrictive 
assumptions about acceptable risk class except as respects the financial community 
as a whole. If a project is identified which the investment community will view 
as having a positive present value, it should be taken on, whether its risk is higher 
or lower than the company's existing projects (which may well differ in degree of 
risk among themselves). It is not generally corporate management's duty to reflect 
the risk-return preferences of particular investors in publicly-held firms if the indi- 
vidual investors are appropriately informed about asset changes in the corporate 
portfolio. They can adjust to their own risk preferences by selling some shares, buy- 
ing others, or increasing or reducing leverage. In short, as between P and S the 
determination of whose is the opportunity should be unaffected by the fact that it is 
in a different risk class from that of either P or S -so long as the opportunity has 
positive expectations. 
67 Courts frequently refer to the enterprise's line of business in assessing 
whether the opportunity "belonged" to it. "Line of business" is, of course, an 
imprecise concept. While it appears to exclude totally unrelated activities (of the 
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tion of unclassified investments, but not on the factfinding process 
itself. 
III. TWO-STEP ACQUISITIONS 
Integrated mergers--mergers which follow immediately or 
very shortly after the purchase of a controlling stock interest in 
the target company - have become a common event during the 
past dozen years, largely as a consequence of the growth of con- 
glomerates and the increased use of tender offers as an acquisition 
technique. In many instances the public tender (or exchange) 
offer is itself preceded by an unsuccessful attempt to reach agree- 
ment with the target company's management on a voluntary 
merger. When that attempt breaks down, the acquiring company 
often resorts to direct solicitation of the stockholders- over the 
heads of management - with the object of obtaining a large 
enough percentage of the target company's shares to assure ap- 
proval of any merger plan that it may subsequently propose. 
Incumbent management can usually be expected actively to op- 
pose the tender offer in these circumstances. While the cost per 
share of acquiring control is therefore likely to be considerably 
sort frequently assembled in a conglomerate), it includes complementary activities 
or any operating activity which is "so closely associated with the existing and 
prospective activities of the corporation that the defendants should fairly have 
acquired that business for or made it available to the corporation." Rosenblum v. 
Judson Eng'r Corp., 99 N.H. 267, 273, IO9 A.2d 558, 563 (I954). See also Guth 
v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 277-80, 5 A.2d 503, 5I3-14 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Pro- 
duction Mach. Co. v. Howe, 327 Mass. 372, 99 N.E.2d 32 (195I). The line-of- 
business cases also rely on additional factors. Such essentially fortuitous variables 
as whether the opportunity was "offered" to the corporation or to the usurping 
officer or director, whether the corporation was "able" to finance the opportunity 
when it was offered, or whether its charter or bylaws permitted acceptance of the 
opportunity have entered into the decisions. At best, the analysis in the opinions 
suggests that the line-of-business requirement is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for an activity to constitute an "opportunity." See Burg v. Horn, 380 
F.2d 897 (2d Cir. I967); Walker, Legal Handles Used to Open or Close the Corpo- 
rate Opportunity Door, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 608 (1961); Note, Corporate Oppor- 
tunity, 74 HARV. L. REV. 765 (1961). Some of the opinions suggest, however, that 
an activity not thought to be within the corporation's line of business nevertheless 
can constitute a corporate opportunity usurped by the officers or directors, see 
Equity Corp. v. Milton, 43 Del. Ch. i60, i65, 221 A.2d 494, 497 (Sup. Ct. 1966); 
Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 487, I2i A.2d 919, 924 (Sup. Ct. 1956); 
Durfee v. Durfee Canning Co., 323 Mass. 187, 199, 8o N.E.2d 522, 529 (1948), 
and it has often been held that an activity plainly within the corporation's line of 
business was not such an opportunity, presumably because it was not "essential" 
to preservation of the business. See Burg v. Horn, supra, at 200; American Inv. 
Co. v. Lichtenstein, 134 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mo. I955); Colorado & Utah Coal 
Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 49 P.2d 429 (I935); Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 
309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (I94I). See also Note, supra, at 772-74. 
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higher than the cost per share of purchasing assets with manage- 
ment's consent, the entire cost of the acquisition will obviously 
depend on what further consideration must be paid in the second- 
step merger. Less commonly, but still not infrequently, control 
may be acquired from a single stockholder or group of related 
stockholders in a privately negotiated transaction. In both in- 
stances, the combined cost of the control purchase and the subse- 
quent merger represents the true acquisition price of the two-step 
takeover. These two acquisition patterns may not exhaust the 
field,68 but they are probably the principal instances in which 
merger serves as the tag-end, or subordinate step, in what is essen- 
tially a unitary procedure aimed at taking full ownership of the 
target company's assets. 
When full ownership is acquired in one step the stockholders 
of the acquired concern are entitled to approve the sale or merger 
in advance by majority vote, and to share pro rata in the total 
proceeds. The question we consider in this part is whether the 
same rights (or a reasonable substitute) should be afforded even 
though two transactions are involved in the acquisition. In that 
posture the focus of the problem shifts from fairness in self-dealing 
to fairness in dividing an aggregate purchase price between the 
two groups of stockholders in the sold corporation - those who 
sold "control" and the others - on the premise that the price paid 
for control is the benchmark of fairness. 
A. Negotiated Transactions 
Taking up the transactions mentioned above in reverse order, 
suppose that P acquires a controlling interest in S from a single 
individual or related group off the market. Very often the sellers 
in such circumstances will demand a premium for the transfer of 
control. If P further plans to merge with S immediately after the 
acquisition of control, what standard of fair treatment should be 
observed in respect to the public stockholders of S? 
By way of illustration, assume P is willing to pay $i million 
for all the assets of S. S has 200,001 common shares outstanding, 
of which Ioo,ooI are owned by a single individual and Ioo,ooo 
by the public. Though valued at approximately $5 per share by 
P, the S stock is currently selling in the market at $3. The ques- 
tion is whether it would be fair, and permissible, for P to pay 
(say) $600,000 to the controlling stockholder for his so-plus per- 
cent interest, and then complete the acquisition by merging S for 
an additional consideration to the public stockholders of only 
6 Another acquisition method would be market purchases of stock over a 
period of months or even years. Cf. Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co., 27 
F. 625 (C.C.D.N.Y. i886), appeal dismissed, 136 U.S. 645 (I89o). 
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$400,000. From a fairness standpoint the issue that would arise 
is not whether too little had been paid for the assets of S- 
$i million, after all, was the maximum that P stood willing to 
commit. Rather, it is whether the 6o-40 division of proceeds 
between the controlling and the public stockholders is permissible. 
That division is solely the product of a bargain between P and 
the seller of control; in effect, the S minority would be bound by 
an agreement that was made without its consent or even parti- 
cipation. 
In such transactions, the sale of control and the subsequent 
merger are, in substance, integrated steps in a unitary purchase 
of assets. P's aim is to pay not more than $i million for not less 
than all of S's property. Negotiations with the controlling stock- 
holder are presumably directed at establishing an overall pur- 
chase price for the enterprise, and not merely a price for the con- 
trolling interest. If the transaction were cast in a more conven- 
tional form, P would simply pay $i million to S in exchange for 
S's assets, and S would distribute the proceeds of sale to its stock- 
holders as their interests appeared, and would then dissolve. The 
consent of the controlling stockholder would be required for the 
sale itself and for the liquidation, but the right of all the stock- 
holders to share pro rata in the liquidating dividend would have 
been predetermined by the corporate charter and could not be 
altered at the will of the owner of control. By contrast, the two- 
step variation permits the controlling stockholder, with P's col- 
laboration, to effect what amounts to a subordination of the min- 
ority interest by accepting for himself a disproportionate share 
of the liquidation proceeds.69 Moreover, while it is not certain 
that a buyer of control which contemplates merger would offer 
a merger price that is less than the price paid for the control 
shares, the temptation to complete the merger at less than a fair 
price is comparable to the temptation to misappropriate corporate 
opportunities which was found in Perlman v. Feldmann.70 
69 See Seagrave v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. I954). The cases have re- 
quired sharing of the premium obtained on the sale of control when it is shown 
that the buyer wished to acquire Ioo percent of the enterprise and that the seller 
of control knowingly assisted him in this endeavor. See, e.g., American Trust Co. 
v. California W. States Life Ins. Co., I5 Cal. 2d 42, 62-64, 98 P.2d 497, 507-08 
(I940); Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (I969); Com- 
monwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 A. 77 (I91o); Dunnett 
v. Am, 71 F.2d 912 (Ioth Cir. I934). But cf. Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F.2d 68 (Ioth 
Cir.) (proof of deception necessary), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 706 (I937). While the 
cases seem to turn on the fact of the controlling shareholder's knowing assistance, 
the rights of the public stockholders are no less sacrificed when the buyer can 
achieve his goal by conversion in a forced merger rather than by deception with 
the seller's aid. 
70 29I F.2d I73, i76-77 (2d Cir. I955). See also Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 
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How should minority rights be protected in these circum- 
stances? One possible approach is to give the public stockholders 
a formal right of approval by requiring, prior to the purchase of 
control, (i) advance disclosure to them of the intended later 
merger and the price to be paid in that merger,7' and (2) a vote 
by them as a separate class to accept or reject the contemplated 
merger. Thus, the seller of control would be required to bargain 
with the public stockholders for division of the control premium 
in order to obtain their consent to the later merger. But apart 
from the considerable practical difficulties which would have to 
be overcome in devising such a procedure, the fact that the seller 
of control commands the proxy apparatus by which the public 
stockholders' consent is sought makes illusory any bargain be- 
tween public stockholders and the controlling stockholder over 
division of the control premium. The controlling stockholder 
would simply offer the public shareholders as small a share of 
the premium as he thinks necessary to purchase their willingness 
to go along; experience with the use of the proxy apparatus sug- 
gests that stockholders will accept a pittance which bears no 
relationship to any freely bargained division of the premium. 
If a requirement of advance consent by public stockholders 
to the sale of control is not feasible as a procedure for forcing 
the parties to bargain over the division of the premium, any effort 
to enforce judicially a fair division - other than by a pro rata 
461 F.2d II (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (I972); cf. Cole v. Schenley 
Indus., Inc., [I973 Decisions] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 94,003 (S.D.N.Y. I973). 
When sale of the controlling interest is not immediately followed by merger, 
the likelihood that the remaining stockholders will be benefited by the change 
in control is the principal justification for allowing the seller of control to keep 
the premium, and for exposing the remaining stockholders to the risk that the 
buyer will seek to recoup the premium by exploiting them. But that justifica- 
tion is lacking when the buyer plans to buy simultaneously the remaining stock. 
In that case the premium for control is paid for the power to dictate subsequent 
merger terms. See Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ill. 1971). Thus, 
the justification for allowing the seller to retain the premium (i.e., that he was 
thus encouraged to turn control over to a more efficient manager for the benefit 
of the other stockholders) is substantially diluted since the buyer's efficiency will 
not benefit the former public stockholders, and the buyer's principal effort is to 
exploit them in setting the merger price. Cf. Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 
252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1969). 
71 But cf. Abelow v. Symonds, 40 Del. Ch. 462, 184 A.2d 173 (Ch. 1962), aff'd 
sub nom. Abelow v. Midstates Oil Corp., 41 Del. Ch. I45, 189 A.2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 
1963). In Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., [I972-I973 Transfer Binder] CCH 
FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 93,646 (N.D. Ill. I972), the court rejected the argument that 
the seller of control should extract from the buyer a promise to pay in any sub- 
sequent merger the same price to the remaining stockholders as was paid to the 
seller. 
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sharing - is equally problematic. A fictional bargain is no more 
feasible as a device to allocate the premium than it was to deter- 
mine a fair price in a parent-subsidiary merger. Indeed, there is 
substantial basis to urge that when a purchase of control is pri- 
vately negotiated by a buyer who expects thereafter to acquire 
0oo percent of the enterprise, any increment above market being 
paid by the buyer should be divided among all stockholders on a 
pro rata basis. There has been much debate over whether the 
seller of control may generally receive and retain a premium for 
the sale of control.7 But a different and simpler question is pre- 
sented when the buyer contemplates full ownership of the enter- 
prise from the outset. As we have stated, the situation is then 
indistiguishable from a sale of assets followed by a distribution of 
the proceeds in liquidation. Whatever may be the value of con- 
trol and the limits of the controlling stockholders' obligation to 
the minority on a continuing basis,73 there is no doubt that in 
liquidation the assets of the firm must be distributed pro rata to 
all stockholders;74 the corporate charter provides that each out- 
standing share is entitled to a pro rata portion of the company's 
income stream, whether paid out in the form of current dividends 
or as liquidating distributions. Circumvention of that provision 
should not be permitted by executing the transaction in two steps. 
While a controlling stockholder is entitled to elect a majority of 
the board of directors and thereby to dominate the company's 
business policies, nothing in his status as controller empowers him 
to allocate returns on a disproportionate basis. 
Accordingly, a transaction which is effectively a sale of assets 
followed by a distribution of the proceeds in liquidation calls 
72See Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of 
Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965); Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of 
Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 420 (I965); 
Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1220-24 (1958); 
Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1957); Jennings 
Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REV. I (1956); Katz, The Sale of 
Corporate Control, 38 CHI. B. REC. 376 (1957); Leech, Transactions in Corpo- 
rate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725 (1956). 
73 See Note, The Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine in the Context of Parent Sub- 
sidiary Relations, 74 YALE L.J. 338 (1964). 
4 See Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 
1959); Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 
U.S. 675 (1942), on appeal from award of damages, 136 F.2d 876 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 787 (1943); Lebold v. Inland Steamship Co., 82 F.2d 351 
(7th Cir. 1936). But cf. Krafcisin v. Lasalle Madison Hotel Co., [I972-1973 Trans- 
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 93,586 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Abelow v. Symonds, 
40 Del. Ch. 462, 184 A.2d 173 (Ch. 1962), aff'd sub nom. Abelow v. Midstates Oil 
Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 145, 189 A.2d 675 (Sup. Ct. I963). 
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for a flat prohibition against any attempt to differentiate among 
the common shares solely on the basis of the larger number of 
such shares held by a particular stockholder. Such a prohibition 
requires simply that a buyer which purchases the controlling in- 
terest in contemplation of merging out the minority pay the same 
price per share on both occasions, just as if the two-step 75 trans- 
action had been cast in the form of a unitary sale of assets.76 
This, however, need not prohibit P from paying a premium solely 
to the owner of control, provided that the public shares thereafter 
remain outstanding; or, if no merger is contemplated, even from 
paying one price for the control shares and then, after adequate 
disclosure of the prior purchase price,77 inviting tenders of the 
minority shares at a lower price, an invitation which the public 
stockholders would be free to accept or reject in their individual 
discretion. Arguably a buyer which pays $6 per share for the con- 
trolling interest -but with no assurance that the average cost 
per share can be reduced by acquiring the remaining shares for 
less than $6-must consider that the investment value of the 
shares it has purchased is not less than the $6 it has paid for them. 
Presumably, the market will reach the same conclusion once the 
buyer announces its new management plans. Assuming that ex- 
pectation is well founded, the minority stockholders of S would 
then enjoy an equivalent rise in the market value of their shares 
and, in effect, be as well off as the seller of control. 
As indicated, there is disagreement among scholars over 
whether that expectation is, indeed, well founded, and in any 
event, over whether the owner of control should ever be allowed 
to dispose of his shares for a premium without the same oppor- 
tunity being offered to minority stockholders.78 Some authorities 
urge a general requirement of equal sharing or equal opportunity 
on the ground, among others, that control is a corporate asset 
which properly belongs to no particular stockholder. If that view 
is ultimately accepted, the broader requirement of equal oppor- 
tunity which it embodies would easily absorb the limited pre- 
scription urged here. However, whether or not that view is ac- 
cepted, the rule of equal sharing has valid application in the 
75 The difficulties of proving the state of mind of the buyer at the time of its 
acquisition of control raise the question whether to presume an intent to merge if 
the second step is reasonably proximate in time to the acquisition of control. See 
p. 338 & notes 79, 87 infra. 
76 Of course, an increment in the value of S between acquisition of control and 
consummation of the merger may require P to pay a higher price to the public 
shareholders in the merger. See note 79 infra. 
77 Cf. Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F.2d 68 (Ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 706 
(I937); Dunnett v. Arn, 7I F.2d 912 (Ioth Cir. I934). 
78 See note 72 supra. 
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limited circumstance with which we are concerned where ac- 
quisition of control and merger are steps in a single integrated 
transaction. 
B. Public Tenders 
Where P acquires control of S through a public tender offer 
which is preliminary to a complete absorption of S by merger, 
the function of a fairness standard should primarily be one of 
preventing deception. To illustrate, suppose that P offers to buy 
no more than 51 percent of S's shares for cash in a public tender 
offer at $40 per share, but says nothing about its subsequent plans 
for S. If P then promptly merges out the balance of S's stock at 
$30, it is perhaps obvious that the cost to P of acquiring all the 
assets of S is about $35 per share. While this may be a perfectly 
fair price for S's assets, the method of acquisition may not pro- 
vide equal compensation to the two groups of S stockholders, de- 
pending upon the response to the tender offer. If all outstanding 
shares are tendered, and the tenders are taken up pro rata, each 
stockholder will receive the same average price of $35 for his 
shares. If less than all are tendered, plainly some stockholders 
will receive a higher average price per share than others. 
We think it evident that the outcome in the latter case- 
where different prices are paid per stockholder and not merely 
per share- is objectionable as a matter of equitable treatment. 
Once again, since merger is a step that P can virtually force once 
it has obtained control, and since by hypothesis P planned to take 
that step from the beginning, it seems clear that the tender-cum- 
merger must be viewed as a unitary sale of assets. It follows that 
the nontendering stockholders of S should be entitled to no less 
than the tendering stockholders in any distribution of the sale 
proceeds. We do not assert that P is bound to pay the same price 
per share to every S stockholder under all circumstances. But in 
the circumstances given, where P's object is to acquire full owner- 
ship of S in two related steps, with the second being concealed 
from public view at the time the first is taken, it seems to us un- 
fair for nontendering stockholders to sustain a penalty. 
The objection, however, is really a broader one, and can be 
extended even to the case where all, or virtually all, the shares of 
S are tendered in response to the initial offer. To be sure, the pro 
rata acceptance of shares at $40 and the subsequent merger at $30 
would leave each S stockholder with an average payment of $35 
per share, so that inequality among the stockholders is absent. 
But even so, the legal and economic position of the S stockholders 
is plainly weaker than it would be in an ordinary one-step sale of 
assets. In the latter situation, the stockholders would of course 
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be made aware, at the time the sale was submitted for their ap- 
proval, that $35 per share was the price offered by P. A majority 
vote in favor of the sale could then be accepted as based on ade- 
quate knowledge. But in the circumstance where the merger step 
is concealed at the time the tender offer is made, the S stockhold- 
ers obviously cannot know that they will finally be obliged to sell 
all their shares at an average price of $35. Hence, the action of 
the stockholders in accepting a tender offer of $40 can hardly be 
regarded as the practical equivalent of approving by majority 
vote a "real" offer of $35 when the stockholders are unaware at 
the time they tender their shares that the balance of their hold- 
ings will afterwards be merged out at $30. 
It would seem to follow that if the approval rights of the S 
stockholders in a unitary sale of assets are to be carried over and 
made available in the two-step variation, P should be obliged to 
disclose its plans for merger - including its intention to pay only 
$30 for the remaining shares- at the time the initial tender offer 
is announced. Paradoxically, however, although disclosure should 
be the appropriate way of coping with the dangers of conceal- 
ment, the dynamics of the present situation are such that advance 
disclosure of P's merger plans would be likely to reduce, rather 
than enhance, the ability of the S stockholders to make a free 
choice about the proposed sale of assets, unless joined to a rule 
of equal payment per share. Given the inability of S's dispersed 
stockholders to communicate with one another during the tender, 
the act of offering a higher price on tender than would be paid on 
merger would have a "whipsaw" effect on S's stockholders. Indi- 
vidual stockholders would find it difficult or impossible to refuse 
a tender price of $40 when they are also made aware that if the 
tender succeeds, the remaining shares will be merged out at $30. 
In effect, an announced disparity between the tender and the 
merger figure would deprive S's stockholders of their ability to 
make an unforced, independent judgment on whether an average 
of $35 per share is an acceptable overall price for the assets of 
the firm. Hence, although the presence of a concealed disparity 
must be regarded as unfair, the presence of an announced differ- 
ential is plainly coercive. 
The remedy is fairly obvious. What is needed to provide full 
protection for S's stockholders is a double-barrelled safeguard 
consisting of (i) advance disclosure of intent to merge and (2) 
a rule which obligates P to pay the same price per share on merger 
as it offered on tender. All stockholders - whether or not they 
tender - would then receive the same price per share and none 
would be coerced into tendering by the prospect of a lower price 
on merger. In the example above, therefore, under our rule the 
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tender price would have to be reduced and the merger price 
raised to $35, if that represents the maximum price per share 
that P is willing to pay for all the assets of S, with the intent 
to merge being revealed at the time the tender offer is made.79 
P's acquisition effort might very well fail under these conditions; 
if so, however, it would be because of P's unwillingness to pay a 
price that is acceptable to a majority of the S stockholders. 
We should add, again, that if P does not plan a second-step 
merger, it is of course free to set the tender offer at any price it 
wishes. As suggested in connection with private sales of control,80 
a willingness on P's part to pay $40 per share on the initial tender, 
with no expectation that the average cost per share can be re- 
duced by paying less on merger, should be taken to reflect P's 
estimate that a share of S has an intrinsic value of at least $40. 
And that estimate, if sound, will also be reflected in the value of 
S's remaining shares once P's new business plans are made known 
to investors generally. 
Existing case law does not require uniform payments in the 
two-step transaction, although occasional opinions note favorably 
that the consideration paid on merger was not less than that paid 
on the tender or purchase of control, where the two steps were 
79 Once disclosure is made of P's intent to merge, P should not be left free to 
fail to consummate the merger. Only a showing of radically changed circumstances 
should suffice to excuse a failure to consummate. Events such as stock market 
fluctuation or changes in P's financial condition ought not to be accepted as a 
sufficient "change in circumstance" for this purpose. In the absence of excuse, 
if no merger ensues, P should be liable to the public stockholders for not less than 
the tender price. As a consequence, disclosure of an intent to merge at $35 follow- 
ing the tender would tend to peg S's shares at just under that price throughout the 
acquisition period; presumably arbitragers would act to acquire virtually all of 
the company's stock in the expectation that all shares will presently be taken up 
by P at the $35 bid price. Both P and the public stockholders are virtually as 
free of market risks as they would be if P had entered into an agreement to pur- 
chase S's assets. If the tender is on a share-for-share basis, then of course the 
value of S stock will move in a fixed relationship to the value of P stock until the 
acquisition is completed. The market price will presumably be subject to some 
discount for uncertainty as to the consummation of the merger. To avoid any 
temptation to take advantage of the discount, both P and its insiders should be 
precluded from purchasing minority stock during the interim at less than the 
tender price. 
By contrast, failure to disclose the intended second-step merger will, and should, 
result in a nonsymmetrical consequence from P's standpoint. If the market for S's 
untendered shares rises following the tender, P should be obliged to pay the higher 
market price on merger or else forego that step; if the market for S shares drops, 
P should later be obliged to pay the higher tender price or else forego the merger. 
All this follows from the theory of the proposal -which is that P should be re- 
strained from offering more for S's shares on tender than the investment value it 
assigns to those shares, where P's intention is to recoup the excess by later merger. 
80 See p. 335 supra. 
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closely spaced and hence presumably integrated.81 Even with re- 
spect to disclosure requirements, while the language of the Wil- 
liams Act s2 and the import of the Securities Act 83 require dis- 
closure of the terms of any contemplated second-step merger, 
both statutes allow large scope for uncertainty as to whether such 
a second step is actually contemplated. However, while the thrust 
of earlier opinions under the Williams Act was to shy away from 
a reading of the statute to require the parties to "overstate the 
definiteness of plans" to merge,84 more recently judicial admoni- 
tions have been directed against understatement.85 To the extent 
that management of a bidding company is truly uncertain about 
a later merger- and especially about its terms- in the event 
of a successful takeover bid,86 it is impossible to force a mean- 
ingful statement of merger terms at the time of the takeover 
proposal. But it is also impracticable to police effectively on a 
case-by-case basis the acquirers' intentions with respect to merger 
at the time of the takeover proposal. The only feasible solution, 
therefore, is to measure fairness -that is, require payment - 
to the remaining stockholders in the later merger by an amount 
81 See Levin v. Great W. Sugar Co., 406 F.2d 1112, I117-I9 (3d Cir. I968), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 848 (1969); Alcott v. Hyman, 40 Del. Ch. 449, 456-57, 184 
A.2d go, 94-95 (Ch. 1962), aff'd, 42 Del. Ch. 233, 208 A.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1965); 
Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., I55 Md. 66, 8i, I4I A. 425, 432 (1928); 
Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 482, 226 A.2d 585, 602 (I967). 
But see Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967); Northway v. 
TSC Indus., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,646 (N.D. 
Ill. 1972); Abelow v. Symonds, 40 Del. Ch. 462, 184 A.2d 173 (Ch. I962), aff'd 
sub nom. Abelow v. Midstates Oil Corp., 41 Del. Ch. I45, 189 A.2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 
1963). 
82 15 U.S.C. ?? 78m(d)(I)(C), 78n(d) (1970); see Electronic Speciality Co. v. 
International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. I969). 
83 I5 U.S.C. ? 77(a) to 77aa (1970). See also 17 C.F.R. ? 230.434(b) (I973); 
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
84 Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 
(2d Cir. I969). See Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 
1075, 1085 (5th Cir. I970). But cf. In re Susquehanna Corp., Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 8933 (July 17, 1970), [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. 
SEC. L. REP. ?T 77,842, at 83,988. 
85 Compare Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulfur Co., 423 F.2d Io75, 
Io85-86 (5th Cir. 1970), Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 
409 F.2d 937, 948-49 (2d Cir. I969), and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Trans- 
america Corp., 303 F. Supp. I344, I353 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), with Sonesta Int'l Hotels 
Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 253 (2d Cir. I973), and General Host 
Corp. v. Triumph American Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749, 755-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See 
generally Krasik, Tender Offers: The Target Company's Duty of Disclosure, 25 
Bus. LAW. 455 (1969); Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little 
Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 99I (I973). 
86See Feder v. Harrington, [I972-I973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. 
REP. T 93,689, at 93,049 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
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which is equal to the tender price if the merger occurs in any 
period of time reasonably proximate to the takeover, unless a 
showing is made that the merger was actually occasioned by spe- 
cific events that were not initially foreseen.87 
In the event that the tender offer and merger are truly inde- 
pendent transactions, the fairness of the price paid on merger 
would be determined in accordance with the fiduciary principle 
described in Part II.88 But where the tender offer and merger are 
integrated steps, the obligation of management is to avoid de- 
ception. This goal is best implemented by a requirement of dis- 
closure coupled with a prohibition against differential payments 
per share. 
C. The Problem of Side Payments 
It may be of some interest to note that if stated in terms of 
"fairness," the requirement of equal treatment suggested above 
promotes at last a "true" arm's-length standard of fiduciary con- 
duct: in effect, the price that is regarded as fair on the merger of 
the subsidiary into its parent is necessarily the same price that 
was offered by an "outsider" (P) immediately prior to the merger. 
This is not to deny, however, that even the apparently arm's- 
length price arrived at either in a privately negotiated sale of 
control or on a tender solicitation may be tainted. In a negoti- 
ated sale of control, part of the purchase price of the stock may 
be concealed in employment contracts or other side payments to 
the seller, so that the purchase price is not the equivalent of an 
arm's-length bargain price. In the case of a tender offer, if the 
solicitation is made in anticipation of an acquiescent or even a 
neutral reaction by the incumbent management of the target com- 
pany, experience indicates that often the price will be lower than 
if the takeover were actively opposed by the incumbents.89 If 
87 To avoid the bog of subjective intent which characterizes tax problems in- 
volving such mergers, see, e.g., Note, The Relevancy of Subjective Intent in Two- 
Step Asset Acquisitions, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 589 (1974), and in which the 
ingenuity of corporate lawyers can mire the acquiring corporation's disclosure, 
cf. Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. 
REP. 1f 94,722 (N.D. Fla., July 15, 1974); Metz, GL's Cerro-Assets Plan, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. i8, 1974, at 56, cols. 3-4, some rule of thumb is required for deter- 
mining when the transactions are integrated. One rule, but neither the only nor 
necessarily the best one, would raise a presumption that the tender offer was 
undertaken with an intent to merge if a merger in fact follows within a stated 
period of years after a successful tender. Such a rule could be adopted by 
the SEC if consistent with the results of its pending investigation of takeovers. 
Cf. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5526, [I974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. 
SEC. L. REP. 1[ 79,956 (Sept. 9, I974). 
88 See pp. 3 8-25 supra. 
89 By contrast, if the tender offer is made over the opposition of the target 
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management's reaction is shaped by considerations of self-interest 
-job security and personal income -then quite obviously the 
tender price must be regarded as the product of a corrupt ar- 
rangement, and in that respect is unfair. 
When there is reason to suspect that side payments either 
have induced a target's management to temper opposition to a 
merger or have constituted part of the premium paid to a seller 
of control, it is entirely appropriate to make available a challenge 
to the fairness of a merger price notwithstanding its equivalence 
to the price paid in a successful tender offer or a negotiated pur- 
chase of control. The problem occasioned by such side payments 
involves two kinds of inquiries. In the first place, there is the 
question whether deception was practiced either on those stock- 
holders who tendered in response to the public solicitation or on 
those who later acquiesced in the merger, if they were not in- 
formed of the side payments and their possible impact on the 
company's management, the tender price is not tainted by side payments. And 
since it is made against the possibility - often realized - of competitive bidding, 
see G. MCCARTHY, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS I3 (1963), it is likely to offer 
stockholders a price which would not be exceeded by other bidders. Hence, the 
nontendering stockholders find themselves in the position of a minority in an 
enterprise whose assets have been sold for the highest price-a price which there 
is no reason to suspect is corrupted either by managerial acquiescence in exchange 
for side payments or by chilled bidding. 
Even an overhead tender price is likely (in the absence of strong opposition) 
to produce less for a seller than would theoretically be produced by a hypothetical 
bargain between management of a seller single-mindedly devoted to getting the 
maximum price and management of a buyer equally devoted to paying the mini- 
mum price. Since the tender price is unilaterally set at what the buyer believes 
is just enough to capture the public stockholders' acquiescence, it will not reflect 
the same sharing of the full gains of the merger, which a single negotiator for the 
seller is more likely to perceive and demand than would the dispersed stockholders 
of the seller. The seller's public stockholders are thus exposed to the risk of 
receiving less from a tender solicitor than they would receive in a bargain nego- 
tiated by diligent management, because each investor's individual interest is so 
fractured as to preclude either the efficient acquisition of investment information 
or the exercise of the concentrated bargaining power which would be available in 
a merger negotiation conducted on their behalf. There is no evidence that either 
the original issue price or the later market prices of a corporation's stock generally 
reflect that ultimate risk of dispersed ownership. But that risk matures, and pro- 
duces a tender price which reflects it, when a scattered and unorganized constit- 
uency of stockholders is faced with an offer from a single buyer who has the 
facilities and talent to perceive advantages unascertainable by the dispersed of- 
ferees. If the rights of minority stockholders in a merger should reflect that risk, 
the measure of fair treatment should be the theoretical operation of the market 
for takeovers by tender solicitation-i.e., the overhead tender-offer price. By 
that test, the public stockholders are entitled to something less than the share of 
the gains of the merger which they would receive if they acted in a coherent and 
organized fashion through an efficient and diligent management. 
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tender price or on the price paid for control.90 In the second 
place, it involves all the complex questions encountered in at- 
tempting to define and apply a fairness standard to mergers be- 
tween previously unrelated companies. As in the case of such 
mergers, the first stage of a two-step merger may involve a trans- 
action negotiated with, and agreed to by, the management or 
controlling element of the target company. In exchange for their 
acquiescence, the target's management is in a position to exact 
a fee or commission.91 The acquiring company will be willing to 
make such a side payment because it will represent only a frac- 
tion of the reduction in purchase price which would have been 
sought by a nonacquiescent management. There is ample evi- 
dence to suggest that the cost to the acquiring company of carry- 
ing out an acquisition by merger will be substantially less than 
that associated with other takeover devices such as tender bids.92 
90See, e.g., Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ill. I97I); cf. Vine v. 
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (I967) 
(stockholder need not show reliance). 
91 Such commissions commonly take the form of extended employment con- 
tracts, bonuses, stock options, or other varieties of management compensation, 
some portion or occasionally all of which actually represents the purchase price of 
management's consent to the acquisition. See note 92 infra. 
92 Commentators who are not noted for their hostility towards management 
have indicated that a lively sense of favors bestowed, or to be bestowed, upon the 
seller's management affects its willingness to negotiate a lower price in mergers. 
See, e.g., Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. 
PA. L. REV. 317, 318 (I967); Hearings on S. 51o Before the Subcomm. on Securities 
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 9oth Cong., ist Sess. 222, 228-30 
(1967) [hereinafter cited as I967 Hearings]; Manne, Mergers and the Market for 
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. IIo, ii8 (1965). See also Eisenberg, supra 
note I, at 27. And those seeking to acquire an enterprise regularly consider how 
much it will be necessary to do for the benefit solely of the target's management 
in order to obtain its cooperation in the acquisition. See Fleischer & Mundheim, 
supra, at 318; 1967 Hearings, supra, at 228. See also Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 
212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 
F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. I97I); Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ill. 
I97I); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer, 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 760 (Ch. I967). 
Most important, there is evidence suggesting that overhead tenders cost more (from 
the acquiring company's standpoint) than unopposed tenders, see 1967 Hearings, 
supra, and presumably, therefore more than negotiated mergers. There is also 
reason to believe that the managements of acquiring corporations will often over- 
pay for the acquired corporations because their personal interest so requires, rather 
than because the interests of the stockholders of the acquiring corporation so re- 
quire. See, e.g., Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. I969), cert. denied, 
397 U.S. 989 (1970); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 3Io A.2d 904 (Del. 
Ch. I973); Lewis v. Scotten Dillon Co., 306 A.2d 755 (Del. Ch. 1973); Lewis v. 
Hat Corp. of America, 38 Del. Ch. 313, I50 A.2d 750 (Ch. I959). See generally 
W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (1959); R. GORDON, BUSI- 
NESS LEADERSHIP N THE LARGE CORPORATION (1961); R. MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC 
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The objection to this outcome from the standpoint of fiduciary 
theory is clear. Legally, the proceeds of merger and takeover 
belong exclusively to the shareholders of the companies involved 
and may not, to any extent, be drained off into the pockets of 
directors as such. Management has no legal right whatever to 
receive commissions on a transfer of company assets to a new 
set of managers, or to be rewarded by outsiders for the exercise 
of its discretionary authority in submitting the merger plan to its 
stockholders. Not only would any such side payments have to 
be refunded if initially accepted, but the propriety of the entire 
agreement would be open to inquiry.93 
All this is hardly disputable. But except for an occasional 
instance in which a side payment has been impossible to conceal, 
the prohibition against special rewards to incumbent managers 
has also proved well-nigh unenforceable.94 It is extremely diffi- 
cult to prove that management's judgment has been tainted by 
self-interest, or that expectations of personal gain have led to price 
concessions at the stockholders' expense. Employment arrange- 
ments apparently entered into by parties dealing with each other 
at arm's length are hard to challenge on their own terms, espe- 
cially when the parties themselves are prepared to testify in sup- 
port of the honest character of their undertakings. In effect, 
quantitative proof of wrongdoing on the part of individual man- 
agers and of its impact upon the merger price - which is what is 
needed if fiduciary rules are to be enforced directly in these cir- 
cumstances - is virtually unattainable. 
The solution, if there is one, to this abuse requires a search 
for procedures to enable effective judicial or administrative re- 
view of the process of bargaining so that effect may be given to 
the role of side payments.95 It will also inevitably entail a re- 
THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL" CAPITALISM 46-I09, 225-65 (I964); McGuire, Chiu, 
& Elbing, Executive Incomes, Sales and Profits, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 753 (I962); 
Marris, Profitability and Growth in the Individual Firm, BUSINESS RATIOS (Spring 
I967). 
3 See Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch. 262, 92 A.2d 311 
(Ch. 1952); cf. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d I73 (2d Cir. I955). 
94See, e.g., Jackson Co. v. Gardiner Inv. Co., 200 F. II3 (Ist Cir. I912); 
Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 3Io A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. I973); Marks v. Wolf- 
son, 41 Del. Ch. II5, I88 A.2d 680 (Ch. I963); Alcott v. Hyman, 40 Del. Ch. 449, 
184 A.2d go (Ch. g962), aff'd, 42 Del. Ch. 233, 208 A.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. I965); Lewis 
v. Hat Corp. of America, 38 Del. Ch. 313, I50 A.2d 750 (Ch. I959); Cotterell v. 
Pawcatuck, 35 Del. Ch. 309, II6 A.2d 787 (Ch. I955), aff'd, I28 A.2d 226 (Sup. 
Ct. I956), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 355 U.S. 12 (I957); Fidanque v. 
American Maracaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch. 262, 92 A.2d 311 (Ch. I952); Mitchell v. 
Highland-Western Glass Co., 19 Del. Ch. 326, 167 A. 83I (Ch. I933); Allaun v. 
Consolidated Oil Co., i6 Del. Ch. 318, 147 A. 257 (Ch. I929); Allied Chem. & Dye 
Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, I4 Del. Ch. i, 120 A. 486 (Ch. I923). 
95 In mergers between previously unrelated enterprises, the courts tend to view 
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examination of the operating assumptions of the fiduciary stan- 
dard which measures fairness by reference to imputed arm's-length 
exchanges of the securities of merging companies for which there 
may be no readily ascertainable market prices. The indetermin- 
acies to which these assumptions lead 96 imply a further search 
for a solution.97 That search, however, is beyond the scope of the 
present discussion. 
the management of the acquired company as uncorruptedly seeking the best pos- 
sible bargain for the enterprise, and therefore apply the business judgment test 
in weighing challenges to the fairness of the transaction. Under the test, little short 
of actual fraud, in the sense of intentional deceit of the seller's management, will 
support a finding of unfairness. See, e.g., Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 
599, 609-Io (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Marks v. Wolfson, 
41 Del. Ch. II5, i88 A.2d 680 (Ch. I963); Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 
i8 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. I83 (Ch. I931); Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., i6 Del. 
Ch. 318, 147 A. 257 (Ch. I929). To recognize the pervasiveness of side pay- 
ments to, or personal incentives of, managements in effecting mergers is not 
to assert that in all mergers management's judgment-i.e., the merger price- 
has in fact been tainted by self-interest. There is ample evidence to suggest that 
acquiring companies, particularly conglomerates, often wish to retain the acquired 
company's management for its continued usefulness, and will pay extra to induce 
that management to remain. See Herrmann, Corporate Acquisition Criteria: A 
Study, 8 MERGERS & ACQUISITION 4 (Summer I973). Similarly, whatever the 
merits of the debate over management's preference for growth or profitability, 
the management of an acquiring company is not inevitably motivated to increase 
the size of the company at the expense of increased profitability. Hence a pro- 
phylactic presumption of corrupting side payments would be untenable because it 
would prevent or discourage desirable mergers, where clearly the acquiring corpo- 
ration wishes to retain the acquired company's management because of its effective- 
ness in the future and not because of its assistance in the acquisition process. To 
reject a prophylactic approach, however, does not require courts to blind them- 
selves to the pervasive temptation for a seller's management to accept less than 
the maximum amount obtainable for its stockholders because it understands that 
its own compensation and rewards are inextricably involved in the process. 
Whatever may be the solution to the problem of deference to the business 
judgment of management in determining fairness when negotiated mergers between 
previously unrelated companies are challenged, arguably a somewhat different prob- 
lem is presented by a challenge to a merger proposed immediately after a public 
tender offer. That offer, with its attendant publicity and disclosures, may suggest 
a "fairer" price than obtains when a privately negotiated merger occurs, and there- 
fore, a less pressing need for a critical view of the likelihood (or the effect) of 
side payments' being made to the target company's management. On that less 
critical view, a complainant challenging a merger after a public tender offer must 
bear the conventional burden of demonstrating either that the disclosure was 
inadequate or that side payments have in fact been made to the target's manage- 
ment and have influenced it to support or to refrain from opposing the merger. 
In the absence of such proof, the propriety of the transaction may appropriately 
be measured against the tender price. 
96 See p. 316-17 & note 49 supra. 
97 In the alternative, various proposals have been made which would reduce 
management's domination and control over the merger process. It has been sug- 
gested, for example, that a higher stockholder majority be required than the 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Our principal effort in this Article has been to work out rules 
of equitable division in mergers between parent corporations and 
partly-owned subsidiaries. We have tried to construct a plausible 
sharing formula which satisfies the legitimate claims on both sides 
of the transaction, and in the process have concluded that the 
familiar concept of arm's-length dealing needs either to be dis- 
carded or reinterpreted. The implications of this finding extend 
to transactions between parent and subsidiary entirely apart from 
mergers - particularly in respect to the allocation of opportuni- 
ties for growth and diversification. 
We have also considered what rules should apply where the 
merger of a controlled subsidiary serves as the second step in a 
unitary process aimed at purchasing all of the subsidiary's assets. 
We have argued that existing rules should be reformed, or at 
least clarified, so as to assure that the rights of the subsidiary's 
stockholders - to avoid being deceived about the buyer's overall 
purpose, and to share equally in the proceeds of sale - are ade- 
quately protected. 
We have urged that fairness requires recognition and sharing 
of gains from mergers and that, at least in parent-subsidiary 
mergers, the most appropriate basis for a sharing formula by 
which to measure fairness is an equal return on the contribution 
made to the merger by each set of stockholders. Concededly, our 
proposals do not solve the intractable valuation problems which 
have bedeviled challenges to merger proceedings in the past, and 
simple (or even the two-thirds) majority found in most state statutes; that the 
direct submission to stockholders of competitive merger bids be permitted; that 
a longer period be required for consideration of, and organization of a response 
to merger proposals; or that stockholders be permitted to have some voice in 
initiating or modifying the merger proposal. See Eisenberg, supra note I. 
However. the likelihood of such institutional changes being made by state 
legislatures is not great. Far from enhancing the stockholder's role, state statutes 
are increasingly giving him less participation in the approval process. See, e.g., 
ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ? 80 (I969); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, ?? 25I(k), 
253 (Supp. 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. ? I4A:II-I (Supp. I974). Thus, the pro- 
portion of the vote required for approval has been reduced from two-thirds to a 
simple majority in many jurisdictions. If the requirement of ratification thus 
offers a shield of only limited protective value, it may also be a cumbersome dis- 
service to stockholders. To the extent that courts regard it as a meaningful pro- 
tection, and therefore restrain their intervention in assessing the fairness of the 
merger, it is a false basis for denying judicial protection. See SEC PROTECTIVE 
COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 2, at 554. 
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which create the uncertainties that erode enforcement of any 
proposed standard. But making more explicit the considerations 
which determine fairness should help to narrow the range of the 
difficulties faced by challengers and the imponderables confront- 
ing courts in valuation proceedings in which management controls 
the bulk of the evidence addressed to the future of the enterprise. 
Moreover, explicit standards of fairness imply expanded dis- 
closure obligations which, in turn, should further reduce the lee- 
way which management now enjoys, and from which courts now 
suffer, in determining the fairness of mergers.9 To be sure, only 
in two-step mergers, where fairness turns essentially on a price 
established in an actual arm's-length transaction - the purchase 
of control - are the uncertainties of a valuation proceeding sub- 
stantially eliminated. But even where a fair price must be im- 
puted, as in mergers between long-term affiliates, the explicit 
statement of a sharing formula will furnish a benchmark for the 
unavoidable process of approximation, instead of leaving that 
process at large as does the present law. 
98 If the standard of fairness is based on an explicit sharing formula, the infor- 
mation which is material to the merger is more readily identifiable than if a vague 
and indefinite fairness standard is the constraint on the transaction. Not only is 
the mandate to disclose thus made more easily enforceable because the information 
to be disclosed must reveal how the proposed merger relates to a proportionate 
division, but the damages payable for failure to disclose can also be determined. 
The disclosure requirement thus becomes a part of the process of enforcing the re- 
quirement of fairness instead of simply a predicate for a nuisance settlement on 
terms that have no rational connection with any perceived goal of fairness. See 
note 15 supra. 
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